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Bryan Whitman |
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A key senior figure in a Bush administration covert Pentagon
program, which used retired military analysts to produce positive
wartime news coverage, remains in the same position today as a chief
Obama Defense Department spokesman and the agency’s head of all media
operations.
In an examination of Pentagon documents the New York Times obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request — which reporter David Barstow leveraged for his April 2008 Pulitzer Prize-winning exposé
on the program – Raw Story has found that Bryan Whitman surfaces in
over 500 emails and transcripts, revealing the deputy assistant
secretary of defense for media operations was both one of the program’s
senior participants and an active member.
Whitman’s conspicuous presence in these records is notwithstanding
thousands of documented communications the Bush Pentagon released but
for which names were redacted and an untold number the prior
administration successfully withheld after its two-year legal battle
with the Times.
Barstow’s Times expose revealed a comprehensive, covert
Pentagon campaign — beginning during the lead-up to the Iraq War and
continuing through 2008 — that shaped network military analysts into
what internal documents referred to as “message force multipliers” and
“surrogates” who could be trusted to parrot Bush administration talking
points “in the form of their own opinions.” Barstow’s reporting also
detailed how most of the military analysts, traditionally viewed as
authoritative and independent, had ties to defense contractors with a
stake in the same war policies they were interpreting daily to the
American public.
The program was ostensibly run out of the Pentagon’s public affairs
office for community relations, as part of its outreach, and attended
to by political appointees, most visibly in these records by then
community relations chief Allison Barber and director Dallas Lawrence.
But as Barstow noted in his report, in running the program out of
that office rather than from the agency’s regular press office, “the
decision recalled other Bush administration tactics that subverted
traditional journalism.” In addition to concealing the true nature of
the program and the retired military officers’ participation in it,
this tactic produced one other effect.
It provided Bryan Whitman, a career civil servant and senior Defense
Department official who oversees the press office and all media
operations, cover if and when the program was revealed.
Additionally, while political appointees tend to come and go with
each new administration, Whitman would be there before the program and
he would be there after it. His status as a career civil servant, the
fact that he’s worked for both Democratic and Republican
administrations – something he points out often in public settings and
did at the close of his recent phone interview with Raw Story — has
also served to buffer him thus far from scrutiny regarding his
involvement in this program.
In a conversation with Mr. Whitman, he denied any involvement or
senior role in the program, saying he only had “knowledge” of its
existence and called the assertion “not accurate.”
Asked to explain the hundreds of records showing otherwise, Mr.
Whitman replied, “No, I’m familiar with those documents and I’d just
beg to differ with you,” though he did acknowledge being in “some” of
them.
In defending his claim that he wasn’t involved in the program,
Whitman reiterated numerous times that since it was not run out of his
office, it was not under “my purview or my responsibility.”
Yet records clearly reveal that Whitman was not only fully aware of
the program’s intent but also zealously pursued its goal of arming the
military analysts with Pentagon talking points in an effort to dominate
each relevant news cycle. He was consulted regularly, doled out
directives, actively participated and was constantly in the loop.
Documented communications show that Whitman played a senior role in
securing generals to brief the analysts, fashioned talking points to
feed them, called analyst meetings to put out Pentagon and Bush
administration PR fires, hosted meetings, determined which analysts
should attend trips to wartime military sites (such as the detention
center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) and received frequent, comprehensive
reports detailing the analysts’ impact on the air, in print and online.
In the Mix and Calling Shots
Records reveal Bryan Whitman as an ever-present force in the retired
military analyst program, whether utilizing the analysts to push back
against negative news coverage on insufficient body armor for soldiers,
the abuse of detainees, setbacks in Iraq, and other incidents and war
policies.
In David Barstow’s Times expose, a prime example of how the
Pentagon “enlisted analysts as a rapid reaction force to rebut”
unfavorable coverage was illustrated in an email sent by “a senior
Pentagon official” after news broke that troops in Iraq were dying
because they had received insufficient body armor: “I think our
analysts – properly armed – can push back in that arena.”
That senior Pentagon official, documents show, was Bryan Whitman.
In the complete, unedited January 2006 email (pdf link, p. 84) from Whitman (he sometimes used “military analyst” or “analyst” when indicating the plural form “analysts”), he said:
“In addition to all the nice work yesterday, I think it is still a
good idea to have [US Army Maj. Gen.] Sorenson do a phone call with the
Military Analyst. There were a number of critical Op-Ed pieces that
popped up today and I think our analyst — properly armed — can push
back in that arena. We can set it all up, just need a time he could do
it with a little advance notice to get them all on the phone.”
Whitman sent this email directly to members of US Army Office for
public affairs and cc’ed then Pentagon press secretary Eric Ruff and
community relations chief Allison Barber. The full communication
details Whitman commending the team’s initial efforts to push back
against damaging news from the prior day, and defining the strategy and
calling for a new military analyst meeting, with the additional
directive “[w]e can set it all up.”
The communication displays the range of Whitman’s involvement, his
facility within the program’s fluid apparatus, his clout as a senior
participant, as well as a full understanding of, and commitment to, its
goals.
Other documents also expose Whitman’s breadth and depth of participation and his direct impact on the program’s success.
On March 9, 2005, the day before Vice Admiral Albert T. Church, a
Naval Inspector General, testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee about his report on detainee detention operations and
interrogation techniques, he briefed the military analysts. Whitman
hosted the analyst briefing (pdf link, pages 1-13).
Church led with his report’s primary takeaway: “[W]e found no policy
that condoned or in any way considered torture” or “condoned or in any
way encouraged abuse of detainees.” But he also told the analysts that
“interrogators were starting to clamp up and we were losing
intelligence,” a point he mentioned he omitted from the report but for
which a “debate” was necessary.
Whitman later opened up the floor to other officials who “might be
helpful for you tomorrow as you’re having to talk through some of these
issues.”
A leader from the Office of Detainee Affairs (whose name is
redacted) assured the analysts “that from the beginning of the war on
terrorism both the President and the Secretary of Defense made clear
that all detainees would be treated humanely.” An Army official (name
also redacted) followed by beginning, “Gentlemen, let me give you kind
of the big headline up front.”
Whitman closed the military analyst meeting with a “reminder of the
ground rules” that “the information is embargoed until 7:00 a.m.
tomorrow, with any direct attribution to Admiral Church when the
testimony begins and no direct attribution to our other officials.”
They were armed with their talking points before Church’s testimony even began.
He also invited the analysts to give their “feedback on doing this
ahead of an event” as “opposed to after we’ve announced something,”
with the additional solicitation “[i]f it works for you under these
type of conditions I think we would like to bring you in early on
something.”
The following day, Church’s report and testimony received withering criticism
for failing to assess the accountability of senior officials involved
in policies that led to abuse. But that wouldn’t deter the military
analysts, especially one of the Pentagon’s most fervent and prolific
members, Jed Babbin, former undersecretary of defense during the first
Bush administration.
In his March 11, 2005 New York Post op-ed column (pdf link,
pages 150-151), the day after Church presented his report to Congress,
Babbin published an article titled “Torture Truths,” in which he not
only parroted talking points from the briefing but added his own
personal touch, warning that the United States must “reject the tide of
political correctness that threatens to drown our interrogators.”
That day, Whitman emailed the article to then Pentagon public affairs chief Larry Di Rita (pdf link, p. 150), making clear that they “need to keep this dog fed.”
And with Whitman’s help, that’s exactly what they did.
In July 2005, records show (pdf link,
pages 79-86) press secretary Eric Ruff contacting Whitman about a
request from Babbin to interview Brigadier General Jay Hood — then the
commander in charge of detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay — when
Babbin filled in as host on “The Mark Larson Show,” a conservative
radio program out of KOGO in San Diego.
Whitman replied, “We can work it,” adding, “but I hope you are getting a cut of Babbins [sic] action as his agent.”
In a following email to military public affair officials to secure
Hood, Whitman assured them, “As you probably know, Jed is very friendly
and supportive.” Soon, Whitman had not only worked it but sealed the
deal, writing to Ruff three days later, “FYI – Hood is on with Babbin.”
Throughout the records, Whitman and his team, in return, expressed
their fealty to Babbin, realizing a pliant and tireless operative when
they saw one.
After members of Whitman’s press office, including then director
Roxie Merritt and deputy director Gary Keck, lined up an appearance for
Babbin on “The Bill O’Reilly Show” to discuss detainee abuse
allegations, Whitman, in a particularly effusive March 2005 email (pdf link,
p. 30), commended his crew and gushed, “Good work by all – Babbin will
do us well – we should contact him and ask him if he needs anything – I
will be happy to talk to him.”
Clearly, however, records also show that Whitman and his colleagues knew when it was time to cut loose a wayward analyst.
When 14 marines died in Iraq on August 3, 2005, military analyst
Bill Cowan, a Fox analyst and retired Marine colonel, was scheduled to
appear on Fox’s The O’Reilly Factor. Whitman, along with other Pentagon
public affairs officials involved in the program, received an email
(sent by a redacted source pdf link,
p. 3) which said that Cowan “wanted to give us a heads-up about what
he’s going to say” and was also requesting “anything and everything we
can give him [regarding] the deaths of the marines.” Cowan, though, who
Barstow reported had grown frustrated with the Pentagon program, also
noted that his comments “may not all be friendly.”
In another email, Whitman offered, “I’ll talk to him if you like.”
Within a couple of hours, Whitman also confirmed that he had arranged
for one of two generals to speak with Cowan.
Though in this case, Whitman’s efforts notwithstanding, Cowan
(Barstow also detailed) went too far off script for the Pentagon’s
liking when he said that America “is not on a good glide path right
now.”
Cowan told Barstow that the Pentagon “simply didn’t like the fact
that I wasn’t carrying their water” so he was “precipitously fired from
the analysts group” after the appearance.
Other documented communications illustrate Whitman’s shaping and sanctioning program activities such as an August 2005 email (pdf link,
p. 95), which shows Whitman as one of four senior Pentagon officials to
approve the list of attendees for a scheduled military analyst trip to
the Guantanamo Bay detention center.
“I’ve attached the list discussed and agreed to between Cully, Mr.
Smith, Bryan Whitman, and Mr. Haynes,” the sender (name redacted) wrote
to then head of community relations Allison Barber.
The other three senior Pentagon officials cited include, at the
time, acting assistant secretary of defense for public affairs Dorrance
Smith, general counsel WJ Haynes and deputy assistant secretary of
defense for detainee affairs Charles Cully.
Time and again, records show Whitman in the mix, championing the program.
“The analyst[s] are back from Iraq and starting to make do [sic]
their thing – very positive contribution to the reporting,” Whitman
crowed in this December 2005 email (pdf link, p. 106), on the success of the military analysts latest excursion and subsequent on-air offensive.
And throughout, Whitman is consulted on what messaging to spoon feed them, such as in this October 2006 email from Barber (pdf link, p. 115): “Do we have an official line for the military analysts on this?”
Records also show that Whitman, along with his colleagues in the
program, received regular summaries and extensive systematic reports
detailing the military analysts impact around the networks, on the
radio, in print and online, as in this excerpt from one such typical
email from February 2005 (pdf link,
p. 97), addressed (from a redacted source) directly to some of the
usual senior officials involved in the program – Di Rita, Whitman,
Barber and Ruff — and cc’d to dozens of others:
“TV Broadcast Summary: Analysts Tommy Franks, Jed Babbin, Don
Shepperd, Montgomery Meigs and Jack Jacobs were all featured on
national news stations (Fox News, CNN and MSNBC). Generally speaking,
all agreed that the election was not as violent as expected and that
the Iraqi security forces and American troops did a very good job.
Several analysts alluded to the fact that there will be more danger
ahead. The analyst mood was positive as Iraqi events unfolded. …The
attached memo provides information on what each analyst said and how
often they appeared on television.”
Whitman even proved a creative force in getting the most out of the
analysts, seeing opportunities even in a national disaster, such as
Hurricane Katrina.
Two days after Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, then community relations director Dallas Lawrence wrote to Whitman (pdf link,
p. 6), “Bryan, per our chat, at the conclusion of our conference call
this afternoon with Bg Hemingway, I pulsed our analysts to see if there
would be an interest in a 4:15 call today to discuss the DoD response
to Katrina. …There was a universal positive response, several said they
have been doing radio interviews throughout the day and have been asked
several times, what DoD, specifically, is doing.”
Lawrence concluded the email by thanking Whitman and confirming that
an RSVP list for the military analyst meeting on Katrina would arrive
soon.
Part II of this expose will explore how the Pentagon press office
and community relations worked in tandem on the military analyst
program, and how “information dominance” drove not only this project
but the embed program for reporters, about which Bryan Whitman admits
he was “heavily involved in the process.”
(Brad Jacobson is a contributing investigative reporter to Raw Story; additional research provided by Ron Brynaert)
Raw Story