The neo-cons with Dick Cheney in the lead, who at that time represented oil interests, had visualized multiple advantages in colonizing Afghanistan much before 9/11 occurred and George W. Bush assumed presidency. For controlling and moving oil and gas from Caspian Sea and Central Asia, which deposits are considered critical to future global supply but cannot be transported to a sea port for lack of pipelines, Afghanistan was indispensable in the absence of alternative feasible route options. So was Pakistan.  
 
Besides, this colonization could serve other geo-political interests. From Afghanistan the US could contain and infiltrate Iran, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China and Pakistan. It could maintain a spy network focusing on these countries with capability for subversion when needed. It could also launch operations for denuclearizing Pakistan. It had already chosen India as its proxy power for the region and Afghanistan could serve as its base to control the rise of Jehadis and Chinese influence once the US packed up. Both the US and India had an interest in denying China the use of Gawadar port and Pakistani Baluchistan’s land corridor for transporting its oil and industrial raw material that it procures from the Middle East and Africa, as well as discouraging it from engaging in gold and copper mining in Balochistan. These facilities could enable China to gain access to the Arabian Sea.
 
After the Taliban government refused to oblige Bush on the pipeline issue in their meetings in Washington, decision to replace their government with Karzai regime was taken. 9/11 was orchestrated, Al Qaeda blamed, Afghanistan attacked and the Taliban overthrown. Behind the facade of threat to American security and the war on terror, Afghanistan’s occupation began.
 
Eight years later, this military adventure has come to haunt America. Together, the American politicians and the generals muddled up their objectives leading their country into a directionless war. The Bush administration repeatedly said it was not focusing on capturing Al Qaeda leadership. The objective of Obama strategy is to disable Al Qaeda’s from using sanctuaries in Pakistan from where it could target the United States. Except for some vague statements, no one has pinpointed the location of the Al Qaeda leadership so far. Musharraf once said that probably Osama was already dead, as he was seriously ill. One doesn't know who speaks the truth because this is a game of lies and deceit.
 
America’s tactical method was initially defined as ‘counterinsurgency approach’ to a counter-terrorism mission. After the recent change of command, however, the tactical focus is shifting to counterinsurgency not as ‘counter-terrorism’ but as ‘nation building’. Now the US and its allies are also unsure if the Afghanistan mission is still a strategic necessity for them.
 
Thus a poorly executed war allowed the Taliban to stage a comeback. The American people, used as pawns in this game of greed and power, ended up paying dearly. The neo-con dream of occupying Afghanistan remains unfulfilled and will remain so, despite Obama’s renewed efforts.   
 
Obama chose to go along with the neo-con drama. He increased troop strength by 17,000 and committed additional resources to strengthen American forces in the Taliban strongholds, a measure that his commanders felt offered too little too late. General Stanley McChrystal’s has reported that the US is losing the war and he may be able to turn things around with another major surge.

But faced with an unprecedented economic crisis, growing public opposition and pressing domestic issues, Obama is in no position to commit open ended military presence and unlimited spending in Afghanistan. This seriously limits his ability to take the war to a decisive level. And if he does further escalate it, he will lead America into another Vietnam, looking worse than Bush who is despised for America’s current troubles. Obama can then forget a second term when he faces the war weary voters in 2012. 
 
As for the Taliban, their ranks continue to swell with time. Their recruitment picks up with every surge in foreign troops. The Pashtuns from the interior join their ranks for ideological reasons. Others join them because they see no hope under the corrupt Karzai regime, trusting the Taliban more. The Taliban are gaining influence in Tajik and Uzbek areas so far controlled by the Northern Alliance. Then there is the fear of the Taliban that prevents any cooperation by the locals with foreign forces.

More determined, adequately funded and battle hardened under Mullah Omar, who faces neither angry voters nor popularity polls, the Taliban have nothing to lose and everything to gain in their Jihad against ‘infidel’ invaders. Time is on their side, poverty has been their way of life and in Jihad lies their salvation. Already a formidable force in the country’s future political dispensation, they smell victory and will never concede defeat.
 
With this grim outlook and mid term elections not too far away, Obama must take a hard look at his Afghanistan policy. Ground realities demand disengagement from this ruinous war sooner than later.
 
He does face some dilemmas though. He cannot afford to be seen belittling the specter of Al-Qaeda and Jihadist threat to American security that has been hyped to no end by the Republicans. If Obama tries to call this neo-con bluff about ‘war on terror’, no matter how phony and ill conceived it was to begin with, some Democrats might face difficult time come next elections.
 
Then two of his allies, Israel and India, want Obama to denuclearize Pakistan before departing from Afghanistan. For India a nuclear Pakistan obstructs its dream of regional hegemony and a belligerent Israel wants to see a Muslim Pakistan denuclearized to eliminate even an outside chance of a Muslim nuclear response to its attitude towards Palestinians. 
 
There is an international dimension too. The sight of the American military giant, the Goliath, limping back home abandoning the much trumpeted war on terror, could signal American withdrawal from the world stage at a time when its monopoly on power is being challenged by emerging power centers. This would badly compromise Obama’s ability to wield political and military influence in Europe and elsewhere, embolden Russia and give Jihadi movements a shot in the arm. 
         
Obama has until 2011 to gracefully walk out of the Afghan misadventure claiming credit for wrapping up a nasty war. He can avoid the disaster of a Vietnam-like disgraceful exit by appreciating the limits of American power and its inability to pursue the doctrine of “full-spectrum dominance” in the changed geo-strategic scenario. This will require a high degree of statesmanship on his part.
 
Work on exit strategy has reportedly begun. A partial surge might enable him to negotiate from a position of some strength with the Taliban with whom Saudi Arabia presently negotiates on his behalf as interlocutor. The Taliban demand withdrawal of foreign troops before any sustainable agreement is reached. This demand will have to be met somehow. 
 
If Obama succeeds in moving the conflict to a close he will have to recognize that Afghanistan is no more an American-Afghan issue but has assumed international character. Besides the Afghans, Afghanistan’s neighbors also have a stake in its future political framework. Hence a multilateral solution will be inevitable to avoid destabilizing the region in the wake of American withdrawal. 
 
For Obama it will be prudent to gradually withdraw from this imbroglio, leaving it to the UN Security Council to negotiate and implement such an arrangement. Under a mandate of the UNSC an ‘Afghanistan Group of 7’, comprising five permanent members plus Pakistan and Iran should be created and tasked to oversee the gradual withdrawal of foreign troops to be replaced by a UN peacekeeping force. It should also supervise political re-integration, constitutional reform and re-construction while also eliminating drug production and trade. 
 
The Group should also lay down and implement the principles of Afghanistan’s neutrality and international obligations to eliminate terrorism and deal and diffuse any situations that may arise from time to time. The 19th century Belgian neutrality model could perhaps be followed. 
 
Given its strategic location and deep divisions along ethnic lines, Afghanistan would always be open to exploitation by outside powers and neighbors to further their own strategic goals. It would be wise, therefore, to impose a ‘stand still arrangement’ on foreign interventions as well as security threats emanating from that country.
 
Since the outcome of this arrangement would be conditional to the role and conduct of the contiguous neighbors, namely: Pakistan, Iran and China, they will have to agree to a policy of non-intervention.
 
While this option is worked out, important regional issues must be addressed.
 
Pakistan being central to any Afghan solution, its geopolitical sensitivities must not be ignored. Increasing Indian engagement in Afghanistan that Pakistan deems hostile to its security, if not addressed, will force Pakistan to seek Taliban support to neutralize Indian threat. These Indo-Pakistan tensions can jeopardize the multilateral arrangement. Under international pressure both India and Pakistan should be made to enter into a bilateral peace accord to help resolve contentious issues, moving both countries towards peaceful coexistence. 
 
Although Iran has been helpful in the past, its current tensions with the US will likely cause it to refrain from supporting the multilateral arrangement. A way must be found to bring Iran into the mix. 
 
Similarly, Russia’s apprehensions about American intentions to marginalize it and threaten its security and economic interests by manipulating the Central Asian states will have to be allayed. Russia, India, Iran and the Northern Alliance will also have to be persuaded to accept and support the Pashtun dominated government in Kabul that will inevitably include the Taliban.

Foreign Policy Journal (August 15, 2009)