Introduction
Greece is experiencing a triple crisis
that has a profound impact on the economy, society, and the political system. The
economy has experienced a deep, prolonged depression lasting six years, and
continuing. Workers and employees have suffered a 40% loss in income and a
commensurate decline in medical, pension, educational, and welfare benefits. The
political system has witnessed a precipitous decline in electoral support for
previously dominant right and center left parties and the rapid rise
of radical democratic-socialist and fascist parties.
The socio-economic effects of the economic
crash have been exacerbated by the “austerity programs” imposed by the European
Union’s triumvirate. The economic cuts have undermined any economic recovery
and accentuated the reductions in employment, social welfare, and public
investments.
The political consequences resulting
from the extremely harsh policies of the EU and their forceful implementation
by the right and center parties have been dramatic. A vast upheaval has shaken
the entire political system. Previously dominant mainstream parties have been
increasingly rejected, while formerly marginal democratic socialist and radical
right wing parties have made major advances.
The political consequences of the
demise of Greek capitalism require a closer look at the prospects for an
electoral victory for the democratic socialists in the immediate future.
The Rise of Syriza
The rise of the democratic socialists,
more specifically Syriza, has been rapid and substantial. Between October 2009
and 2014 it has grown by a multiple of five: In the elections of October 2009
Syriza got 4.6% of the vote (315,665); in May 2012 16.8% (1,061,928) and in the
most recent elections for the Euro parliament 26.l6% (1,516,699). In contrast
the two previously dominant parties, the rightwing New Democracy (ND) and the
Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) have experienced a precipitous decline. In
October 2009, combined ,they got 77.4%, (5,308, 261); in May 2012, 32%
(2,025,555); and in the recent Euro-Parliamentary elections 30.7% (1,753,592).
The Greek Communist Party has also
declined, despite the crises, and the militancy of its trade union sector. In
the October 2009 elections, they got 8.4% (428,151); in the June 2012 elections
4.5% (277,227); and in the 2014 elections 6.1% (347,487).
In contrast the neo-fascist Golden Dawn
has grown substantially over the same period. In the October 2009 elections
Golden Dawn got .5% (23,566); in June 2012 7% (440,966); and in the Euro-Parliamentary
elections of 2014, 9.4% (536,442).
The demise of the neo-liberal right
(New Democracy) is accompanied by the rise of the radical nationalist right. The
collapse of the neo-liberal social democrats (PASOK) is accompanied by the rise
of the radical left (Syriza) and a new self-styled “center-left” party calling
itself “The River” (POTAMI).
The current electoral map of Greece is
not defined by a dominant party or coalition. The bi-party break-down is
accompanied by fragmentation and polarization. Moreover, the most intransigent
opponents of the European Union’s austerity program and its executors in Greece
are profoundly divided. The Communist Party and Golden Dawn are mortal enemies
of Syriza, thus eliminating any possibility of an “anti-EU” coalition.
The same problem is evident on the
Right. New Democracy and allied parties combine for only 27.4% of the
electorate and are on a downward slope.
PASOK’s embrace of the neo-liberal
agenda has led to the loss of nearly 85% of its voters (2.5 million) over the
past 5 years. Many of their supporters among public sector employees have
turned to Syriza.
The new ‘center-left’ party, “The
River”, which gained 6.7% of the electorate has yet to decide which bloc to
support, essentially bargaining to see with whom it can gain the most
government posts.
Given the current dynamics of declining
pro-EU support and increasing radicalization, what options does Syriza have, if
it is to come to power?
Syriza: Perspectives and Options
Syriza is the only realistic political
vehicle on the Left with mass support, trade union backing and the electoral
machinery for forming a government. Its political trajectory has been in
ascendance – up to point.
The fundamental problem is that after
its spectacular rise between 2009 and 2012, it has stagnated. In the June 2012
elections it got 26.9% and in the May 2014 elections 26.6%. It appears that
Syriza has hit an electoral barrier. Despite the fact that it is Greece’s
leading electoral party; it appears to be unable to advance further and secure
a parliamentary majority. This raises the question of alliances with political
parties to the Left or Right. Moreover, the internal divisions within Syriza
complicate any overtures to possible electoral partners. Syriza has drawn
leaders, cadres and supporters from the former Maoist, Trotskyist and radical
left. Numerous PASOK middle level leaders and electoral supporters have flocked
to Syriza. Many defected as a result of PASOK’s responsibility for the crises
and support for the “austerity” pact with the EU. In addition a number of
ex-Communist trade unionists are now backing Syriza as the only realistic
alternative to the Right; many have repudiated Communist Party sectarianism and
hostility toward other leftist formations. The current leadership of Syriza
has, so far, been able to maintain cohesion by balancing harsh critiques of the
austerity pact, which satisfies the radical sectors, with a refusal to exit the
EU, which accommodates the social-democratic wing of the Party.
At some point in the coming period
Syriza will have to make some hard choices, if it is to form an alternative
government. Each of the following options has advantages and disadvantages,
costs and benefits.
The Radical Option
Syriza opts to ally with the Communist
Party. This is a very difficult choice as the CP demands full compliance with
its program, an equal sharing of key posts in a future government and
recognition of its vanguard role. Given the fact that, electorally, the CP
represents less than one-quarter of the voting strength of Syriza these are
totally unacceptable terms to all sectors of the democratic left. The CP would
have to accept that it will be a minority partner and that it would have to
moderate some of its radical demands. The CP fears that Syriza is just another
version of PASOK – a party that gives left signals and makes right turns. Its
basic argument that Syriza’s refusal to exit the EU is a sign of its basic
opportunism, has some merit. But it refuses to even consider tactical electoral
alliances, or offer critical support in forming municipal governments.
In any case, even if the CP and other
smaller radical left groups joined a Left coalition, it would only add 8.6% to
the electoral total, resulting in a precarious parliamentary majority subject
to defections from the social-democratic wing of Syriza and face constant
threats of defections by Communist maximalists.
The Moderate Option
Syriza could form an alliance with the
so-called center-left parties – PASOK and River parties – on the bases of a
minimum program which would involve a commitment to remain in the EU based on
renegotiating debt payments and the austerity programs, increasing public
spending and ending the privatization of strategic economic sectors. This
opening to the Right, would endanger the internal equilibrium of Syriza: it
risks a split with the powerful radical sector, thus reducing its overall
representation in Parliament.
Even if the Syriza left were to be
pacified by offers of ministerial posts and promises of ‘hard negotiations’
with the EU, it is not likely to succeed in securing substantial concessions
from the EU. Sectors of the latter are likely to welcome a Greek exit. Others
will insist on full compliance with only slight modifications regarding the
size of budget surpluses, increases in public spending and the terms of
privatization. For the EU, the substance of the austerity program, the scope
and depth of privatization, and the obligations to meet interest payments are
non-negotiable. In other words to remain in the EU, Syriza would have to
continue the basic policies of its rightwing predecessor. To remain in the EU Syriza
would have to capitulate and become an updated version of PASOK – and lose its
mass base in the next elections. Syriza leaders could procrastinate, with phony
promises of a future break with the EU when ‘the time is more propitious’ or it
could exit from the EU, losing its center-left allies, but hoping to recoup new
supporters through alternative policies.
The ‘Middle Road’
Syriza could continue as an independent
political movement, without radical left or center-left coalitions, working to
accumulate forces from the stagnant Communists and the disintegrating
right-center regime. It could use its leadership of local and regional
governments to demonstrate its effectiveness and capacity to govern and
ameliorate harsh national policies. It could transform its voting pluralities
in Athens and Attica into majorities via community based councils,
administrating social programs, food kitchens, public works, clinics and public
security.
Conclusion: Perspectives
Syriza, in government and out of the
EU, could re-allocate debt payments, based on a debt moratorium, to public
investments. It could revert to a national currency and end the fiscal
constraints of the EU strait-jacket on budgets, incomes and employment. Control
over monetary policy would allow Syriza to devaluate, to raise the effective
taxes on the kleptocratic millionaires. It could stimulate the economy and end
the deflationary effects of the austerity programs. Protective tariffs, foreign
exchange controls and revitalization of public sector enterprises could
stimulate the local market. Flexible monetary policy could increase tourism. The
cut-off of funding from the EU could be compensated by a 50% cut in military
spending and an exit from NATO. The government could finance start-ups of high
tech, small and medium size enterprises by the large numbers of educated Greeks
currently overseas or unemployed. Greece could increase its ties with non-EU
countries across the globe. Greece would pay a price, especially from the
financial markets. In the immediate period liquidity, external financing and
capital flows would dry-up. Internal opposition from sectors tied to EU markets
and imports would intensify.
No doubt sectors of the old right will
turn to the neo-fascist Golden Dawn Party, as part of a sharper political
polarization. Sectors of the police and army, with the support of NATO, will
conspire to destabilize.
But with mass support in civil society
and the civil bureaucracy, with a majority in the armed forces and police
backing the constitutional government, a Syriza led recovery of sovereignty and
a robust stimulus package could defeat a destabilization conspiracy.
The key to a successful Syriza
government is unity and internal cohesion, and sound and equitable economic
policies that balance economic growth and job creation with the gradual
recovery of social benefits.
Above all Syriza should resist the
populist-clientelistic policies which some of its followers will demand. It
must not take the easy and disastrous road of expanding the public bureaucracy.
There must be greater reliance on highly skilled professionals and
entrepreneurial local innovators who produce useful goods for the market. Public
firms must be reformed. The trade unions must understand that the first priority
of the economic recovery is to create jobs for the 60% of unemployed youth.
Syriza is Greece’s last best hope ...
because waiting in the wings are the EU aligned oligarchs, fascists, and
disloyal NATO military officials eager to take advantage of any misstep in
order to seize power and turn Greece into another Egypt, Thailand or Ukraine.
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