Introduction

On 21 July, Palestinian Legislative Council member Nabil Amr was lying at home watching television when masked gunmen appeared at his residence in the posh Ramallah neighborhood of Al Tireh. The gunmen promptly sprayed a magazine of bullets from behind a garden wall, striking him in the right leg. The gunmen then escaped and Amr was later taken to a local hospital with non-life threatening injuries.

The attack against Amr caps a week of crescendoing instability within the internal Palestinian setting, marked by kidnappings, mass demonstrations, and attacks upon Palestinian Authority [PA] offices. Though the army of international media personnel based in Palestine/ Israel are never slow to cover events like these, suitably tailoring them to fit in with the dehumanizing construct of “Arab mob mentality” which is “predisposed to violence”, remarkably little is revealed as to the causes of the present situation. This of course is nothing new, and represents the continuity of historically decontextualized coverage of the “Palestinian-Israeli conflict”.

But with that said, it is nonetheless important to attempt to lay a critical historical framework for understanding the current events, primarily because they are likely to determine the future of the Palestinian national setting and particularly the resistance it wages against the Israeli occupation. This being the case, it is redundant to obviate that the events witnessed are not isolated (which they are often portrayed as), but rather stem from a continuity of previous events representing at this stage a more advanced process of internal upheaval and transition.

I.  Overview of Recent Events

First, an overview of the events themselves, with some basic information likely not in English print yet.

On 16 July, Gaza Police Superintendent Ghazi Jabali was abducted from his car while traveling along the Gaza coastal road with two body guards. The kidnappers, who later revealed themselves to be the “Jenin Martyrs Brigades”, promptly took Jabali to Bureij refugee camp (their primary stronghold), announced a state of emergency, and took up positions throughout the streets and rooftops preparing for any attempt to storm the camp. The faction’s leaders also warned they would open fire if any PA police officers attempted to enter the camp’s grounds, and quickly demanded that if Jabali was to be released unharmed, he had to be removed from his position and tried for crimes of corruption and abuse of authority.

This was not the first time Jabali was subject to attack for the accusation of corruption. Unknown gunmen attacked his offices in Gaza city at the beginning of this year, while a bomb exploded outside the main entrance of his house, moments after he had left the premise just last April.

Jabali’s name has long been synonymous with corruption in Gaza, a place where the starkness of class divisions within Palestinian society between the haves and have-nots is painfully clear. He is rumored to have his fingers in the pudding of a series of PA held monopolies which control the Gaza economy, in addition to blackmail, extortion and even drug rackets. Jabali’s name is also associated with the rape of several Palestinian women, though none of these accusations of course can be proven, as he has yet to ever be brought in front of a Palestinian judge. Jabali, you see, was the law in Gaza, or at least he thought he was. Despite this, revulsion with Jabali went beyond critiques of his personal lifestyle and actually centered more on his political or rather ‘security’ role within the Palestinian Authority. His goon squads were infamously responsible for attacking several Palestinian demonstrations, including the storming of Al Najah University campus in 1995 (which was holding a protest against PA arrest campaigns at the time), and the attack against Deheisheh refugee camp in 1999 after a visit by Pope John Paul II.

It took several hours of intense negotiation between the Jenin Martyrs Brigades and Gaza security and Fateh big shots before Jabali was finally release (with more than a little egg on his face.) Negotiations were held with Mahmoud Nashbet, a leader in the Jenin Martyrs Brigades. A son of the Fateh movement himself, Nashbet is  known to have joined the Popular Resistance Committees, a unique coalition of all major Palestinian factions formed at the beginning of this Intifada and which united on the common platform of resisting the Israeli occupation. In so doing, the formation represented a rejection of the ‘divide and rule’ logic created under Oslo, where the PA – primarily Fateh – was supposed to undertake the security role of crushing internal dissent to the Accords and the PA rule in general. He later worked to establish a subsidiary of the Popular Resistance Committees within Bureij camp after the Israeli invasion and destruction of Jenin Camp in April 2002, from where the name of the faction he leads (the Jenin Martyrs Brigades) derives.

A spokesman of the Jenin Martyrs Brigades identifying himself as Abu Iyad would later comment on Al Jazeera television: “We abducted Jabali with the goal of striking at one of the main heads of corruption in the Authority. When the PA doesn’t put an end to this kind of  the corruption, we took it upon ourselves to do some accounting of our own. We had given them [the PA] 3 years to do something about it, but to no avail.” Jabali was promptly dismissed from his position, the day after his release by his captors.

The kidnapping of Jabali immediately prompted a wave of similar acts of vigilantism. The very same day, gunmen took control of Khaled Abul ‘Ula, Director of Coordination (with Israel) for the southern Gaza Strip. His kidnappers would making similar accusations of corruption and demanded to speak directly with Arafat himself. No sooner after that abduction, did another group of gunmen commandeer four French aide workers, taking them to the Red Crescent building (associated with Fathi Arafat – Arafat’s brother) in Khan Younis. The kidnapping of the French aide workers was openly conducted by a local Fateh-composed grouping (similar in make-up to the Jenin Martyrs Brigades, and also with good connections to the Popular Resistance Committees) known as the Brigades of the Martyr Abu Rish. This grouping derives its name from a well known Fateh militant from the first Intifada (Abu Rish) who was assassinated by Israeli death squads after the Oslo accords, and during a (supposed) period of Israeli-sponsored amnesty offered to the wanted activists of the first Intifada.

The Abu Rish abductions tended not to focus so much on the issue of corruption but about social ills Palestinian society is facing throughout the course of the Intifada. A spokesman for the group who identified himself as Abu Harun to a local newspaper the following day, commented that the act of kidnapping the four French “was just a means, and not a goal, and was only conducted so that the world would pay attention to the genuine tragedy being faced by the families of those who have had their homes destroyed [by the Israeli occupation], and who cannot find any accommodations  in the southern part of the Gaza strip, particularly in Rafah and Khan Younis.” (Al Quds 19/7/2004) The Abu Rish Brigades, had also staged a previous occupation of the PA television building in Khan Younis months earlier, demanding jobs for the unemployed, particularly its cadre, many of whom have been cut off PA pay rolls for their roles in resistance activity.

Abu Haroun continued his commentary on the abductions: “We apologize to the French for the incident of the kidnapping and confirm that the act itself took place without our knowledge of their nationality. We targeted them only by chance, and just so that our voice could be heard to the European Union and to the world, after the Palestinian leaders became deaf to our repeated cries. We do not forget the role of foreign volunteers, and we particularly salute the martyr Rachel Corrie, the martyr journalist [James] Miller and the [International Solidarity Movement] activist Tom [Hurndall] who were killed at the hands of the Occupation soldiers. We are not terrorists. We always welcome journalist from all nationalities, even Israelis. What happened was a necessity and they [the French hostages] understood our humane demands.”

The wave of abductions in turn brought about a quick series of events. To begin with, the heads of Gaza’s Intelligence (Amin el Hindi) and Preventative Security (Rashid Abu Shbak) branches immediately resigned sighting (literally) “the flight of security” (Al infilat al amni).  Though this expression has become vogue of late amongst resigning PA officials and Palestinian political commentators alike, it tends to gloss over the fact that the very positions which Hindi and Abu Shbak resigned from  were the direct products of the Oslo framework and its colonial logic, and which during the Intifada have been looked upon in increasingly hostile manner by grassroots forces. El Hindi’s right hand man was already killed in a car bomb at the beginning of this Intifada, allegedly by Hamas as payback for his coordinating of the PA-Israeli crackdown of that group during the Oslo period. As for Abu Shbak, the entire raison d’etre of the ‘Preventative Security Service’ which he oversaw was to spy on other Palestinians, and acted as the primary apparatus to imprison the political opposition to Oslo between 1994-2000.

Thinking this to be just another internal power struggle in need of sufficient maneuvering, Arafat promptly declared the dissolving of the former security apparatuses, their condensing into three bodies (the Police, General Security and Intelligence), and designated his cousin (Musa Arafat) as head of General Security in Gaza. The approach of trading portfolios amongst the same clique of loyalist is a typical Arafatist survival technique, but one that this time would quickly explode in his face. Musa Arafat, after all was formerly head of the Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat – try and keep them straight people), and by no means is known for his virtuous or charming political or personal character traits. In fact, his name is still scrawled throughout the streets of Ramallah in  political graffiti that decries “Woe to the scum Musa Arafat”, and signed by Fateh itself. Musa Arafat after all gained infamy in 1998 when his personnel stormed the local Fateh offices in search of “illegal weapons” – the Oslo demand of the day - much to the chagrin of Fateh who regarded it as an act of treason. When the local Fateh branch demonstrated at (Yasser) Arafat’s headquarters, one of the military intelligence people allegedly opened fire killing a young Fateh activist.

No sooner had the news broke that Musa Arafat was coming to town, did more shit break loose in Gaza. 150 armed Fateh members attacked the Military Intelligence headquarters in Rafah, opening their assault with a bulldozer which took down the headquarters’ outer walls. A three hour fire fight erupted injuring 18 Palestinians, three critically. A similar assault would take place that night in Khan Younis, where local Fateh militias also stormed military intelligence headquarters. This time however, there was no resistance waged from the compound as the attackers freed prisoners, took weapon’s caches, burned the office furniture and torched four office vehicles parked outside. A leaflet released by Al Aqsa Martyrs brigade soon afterwards took responsibility for the actions and announced “We proclaim the dissolving of the Military Intelligence in Khan Younis, as the Brigade’s fighters have taken over its headquarters”. The leaflet also confirmed that this “represents a clear message to The Corrupt Musa Arafat”, if it wasn’t clear already. (Al Quds 19/7/2004). These events were further marked by large demonstrations held in Rafah, Khan Younis, Bureij and Gaza City in continued protest to the appointment of Musa Arafat, chanting slogans which particularly targeting him, and corruption in the Authority overall.

II. Seven Points on the Current Situation

What is one to make of all these events, and in such a short amount of time at that? Indeed, much remains to be seen as to what will come of the tensions at play, many of which are below the surface and seemingly steadily rising to the surface. Whatever becomes of the situation – a situation which is clearly changing by the moment and has the possibility to spin out of control - several remarks are necessary to put into perspective the events at large.

I - It is difficult to begin talking about the issue of Palestinian corruption be it political, financial or administrative – and particularly to a Western audience - without what is said falling into a politically charged and uneven playing field that a priori dehumanizes Palestinians. After all, it is the legacy of European colonialism, (and the strategy of Zionist politicians) to uphold the “uncivilized nature” of the colonized, particularly when they resist.  One must be aware that the charge of corruption leveled against the PA from the outside is an instrumental part of the dehumanization and the delegitimaization of the broader national struggle and the historical national leadership of the PLO. It is a charge disingenuously upheld by the US and EU as a condition to extract concessions from the Palestinian leadership, irrespective of the nature of this leadership and its political positions.

It is also a charge that is particularly hypocritical, considering that the Israeli political establishment is no less corrupt than the Palestinian. Just two days after the ‘Jabali Affair’ took place, a Tel Aviv judge was gunned down near his home. From scandals that have to do with bribery, to purchased Masters and PhD degrees for government officials, to double voting schemes in the Knesset itself - just cases of corruption within the past three years - the issue of corruption within the Israeli political establishment (“the only democracy in the Middle East”) goes all the way to the top.  Sharon himself, (not to mention his two sons), was recently investigated for receiving bribes for the purchase of influence to help with the establishment of a casino on a Greek island. Sharon: a casino broker in Prime Minister’s clothing.

This of course is to say nothing of the fact that the entire state of Israel has made its name doing the dirty work of imperialism, from doing business with Apartheid South Africa, to training contras, to East Timor weapons dealing. Sharon himself is an undeniable war criminal with literally tens of thousands of dead Palestinian and Lebanese victims on his hands.

This is all to underscore the fact that charges of corruption are not unique to the Palestinian context, though they are hypocritically leveled against the Palestinian movement for deliberate political purposes, and in a direct racist manner. This is because this delegitimation forms the pretext for the continued dispossession and subjugation of Palestinians, which flow directly from upholding US (and to a lesser degree EU) imperial interests in the region.

II.  The Issue of Corruption

The issue of corruption within the Palestinian polity is doubly hypocritical on behalf of the Israel, the US, UN and EU because this corruption was in fact deliberately encouraged by them during the Oslo years. None of these powers were interested in the promotion of a Palestinian Authority which would adhere to a system of law and order, with clear divisions of labor and authority. This flowed directly from the specific role the Authority was supposed to play in the first place: the PA was supposed to be the local cop which would do what the Israeli army was tired of doing in the first Intifada – attempting to put down a national movement which was demanding the end of the occupation and the right to return to the homes from which they were dispossessed. This is exactly how Rabin justified the Oslo Accords in the first place when trying to get them passed through the Knesset on the eve of the ceremony at the White House: “The Palestinians will be better at it [‘security’ – i.e. squelching dissent] than we were because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme Court and will prevent the Israeli Association of Civil Rights from criticizing the conditions there by denying it access to the area. They will rule by their own methods, freeing, and this is most important, the Israeli army soldiers from having to do what they will do…”

This is why two-thirds of the Oslo agreement dealt with “security considerations”. This is why the US and EU funded to no end the emergence of the security apparatuses which mushroomed under Oslo. This is why delegation after delegation of US, EU, Israeli and UN representatives and diplomats met and courted the security chiefs and economic barons of the PA mini-empire during Oslo, and not so much as a peep was made insinuating ‘corruption’. As long as Hamas was in jail (not to mention the dissent within other factions, including Fateh); as long as the photographs of cutting ribbons and handshakes at ceremonies for economic and political agreements continued; as long as the graduation ceremonies of police force after police force droned on with sonorous brass bands, the cash flow continued to the PA, as did the political consent of the powers that be. This situation only changed after the failed Camp David accords in June 2000, and the subsequent outbreak of the Intifada. It was then that “reforms” were needed, because of course, this “corruption thing” had “gotten way out of control.”

III.  A Means of Governance

As pointed out, the question of corruption within the Palestinian Authority, and particularly under Arafat, is not so much a question of coincidence, but should be understood in different terms. It is neither ‘systematic’, or ‘endemic’, in as much as it is a means of governance – a deliberate tool of garnering power and consolidating position. The economic monopolies distributed amongst the Palestinian elite by Arafat (some of whom came from abroad, some of whom are locally grown) represented in fact a system of patronage which kept the security and economic elites loyal to Arafat himself while competing amongst each other for power and influence. They provided (and continue to provide) Arafat maneuverability in times of crises in terms of finances, influence and power while acting as self-correcting agents ensuring each could not transcend their horizontal positioning vis-à-vis one another, in favor of a more privileged vertical position closer to Arafat himself.

Some of these elites also became the direct political façade of the PA. Abu Ala, the current (though supposedly resigned Prime Minister) is allegedly a main player in the local tobacco market, and presently under investigation by the Palestinian Legislative Council for another of his companies selling Egyptian cement for the construction of Israel’s “Separation wall”.

But Abu Ala is not alone. His predecessor Abu Mazen (the ‘good Palestinian PM’) represented similar interests, as does Jamil al Tarifi, a former PA minister, widely held throughout the West Bank as being an Israeli collaborator. (Tarifi’s contracting company allegedly paves Jewish settlement by-pass roads, and this author has personally witnessed Tarifi contracting equipment clearing the area where the Israeli army checkpoint at Qalandiya now stands at the entrance to Jerusalem from Ramallah.) Nabil Shaath, a Former Minister and well known talking head in the PA coterie, was personally indicted by a Palestinian Legislative Council inquiry on corruption in the late 1990s, though nothing (surprisingly) became of this either.

All this goes to show the widespread nature of the phenomenon of corruption within the PA, which is the hallmark of Arafat’s governance style itself, and not an anomaly or ‘abuse of power’. In a way, Arafat needs these people even more in the present era, as it is particularly these people (the Abu Mazen’s and the Abu Ala’s) who are still being courted by the US and Europeans (and silently by the Israelis), because they are known for their lack of politically principled stands, and their petty infighting for power.

From another angle, Arafat’s style has also created a class of disgruntled elites, who have become increasingly vocal throughout the Intifada. They have begun to form alliances amongst each other (including between disgruntled security and economic elites), and have disingenuously used the discourse on ‘corruption’ as a battering ram to push for power of their own, particularly in the context of the post-Arafat era. This is where the attack against Nabil Amr comes into play. Amr was made ‘Minister of Media Affairs’ under the failed Abu Mazen premiership. Amr and Abu Mazen had aligned themselves with Gaza Preventative Security strongman Mohammed Dahlan during the former’s premiership, and before it was scuttled by Sharon himself. Just a day before the attack, Amr had been on Arabic satellite stations discussing the issue of corruption and demanding “reforms” in what looked to be an Armani suit.

IV.  Reform Lies in the Fateh Movement

The possibility of reform of the PA lies primarily within the Fateh movement itself. As the godfather party of the modern Palestinian national movement, no other organized political faction can take on this enormous task – a task that has long been brewing within the movement itself. The Islamist streams represent too much of a break from the secular PLO tradition deeply ingrained in Palestinian socio-political culture. They are also too easily prey to the question of “foreign money” which drives them, and are relatively political newcomers onto the Palestinian political setting. (Hamas was officially founded in 1987, the Islamic Jihad, in the early 1980s; Fateh conducted its first military operation in 1965). The Palestinian Left is embarrassingly weak, splintered along factional lines, and has only its romantic history to wager, which in these days cashes in for very little.

Furthermore, the Authority itself is nothing less (and never was anything less) than a Fateh dominated institution. All major ministers and security heads are descendents of the Fateh movement – be it originating in the diaspora, or home grown Fateh cadre. This becomes all the more important when one considers that the PA is the sole largest employer in the Occupied Territories. This fact alone enables it to continue to have disproportionate strength simply because it employs 130,000 public sector employees. The dependency of the Palestinian population, particularly in Gaza, upon PA employment is enormous, where economic opportunities are increasingly unavailable throughout the Intifada. In the case of Gaza for example, Israel built an electric fence around the strip over ten years ago, and completely controls what goes in and out. Even the Eretz Industrial Zone  - the local Israeli owned sweatshop for Palestinian labor - has been shut down during the Intifada. Such a situation gives the Authority increased leverage, but also makes issues of corruption increasingly magnified to the local population.

It is within this setting that Fateh has been forced to look at itself in the mirror, and where a whole series of historical and contemporary issues rise to the surface, no longer capable of being ignored. In a rare interview, Nael Abu Sharekh, a well known and trusted leader of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Nablus, made a remarkable series of declarations about the situation inside Fateh, particularly between the PA bureaucrats and elites, and the rank and file fighters on the ground: “The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades – the armed wing of Fateh, is seriously considering breaking off from the group [Fateh]. The only thing that puts off our decision in a final manner is the feeling within the Brigades that it represents the original part of the movement.[…] We have begun to feel a sense of revulsion and nausea because of our belongingness to this party which is led by a bunch of opportunists. We feel this way as a result of their ignoring and abandonment of us” (11/6/2003 Al Quds Al Arabi).

Abu Sharekh described how the members of the Al Aqsa Brigades live in incredibly difficult economic conditions and were not receiving any financial help from the party. This in addition to the fact that they never feel safe and are constantly in danger of being assassinated. “Despite repeated letters calling for assistance, the party has abandoned the fate of its military wing to an unknown fate. They worry about their own interests which could be in danger from Israel if they provided any assistance. They only try to get in contact with us when there is some form of political initiative or a proposal for announcing a ceasefire of sorts. After that, they cut off relations until a new initiative comes up, or a new ceasefire that serves their interests.”.

Less than two weeks after giving the interview, Abu Sharekh together with 6 other comrades from Fateh, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, were killed like fish in a barrel, as Israeli death squads tossed hand grenade after hand grenade into their safe house in the old city of Nablus.

V.  The Real Struggle Led from Gaza

 It is not by accident that the dramatic developments and struggles witnessed on the Palestinian setting are taking place and being led from Gaza, particularly the south. It is the southern section of Gaza where the Intifada from day one has, never cooled down, and seemingly only heated up. For this reason, those looking for what the future trajectory of the national movement will look like should point their gaze to these areas to determine the shape of things to come.

One need  not go far in the Southern Gaza Strip to know the extent and gravity of the situation on the ground after almost four years of Intifada. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Association (responsible for administering aid to Palestinian refugees) no less that 18,000 people have been turned into refugees from their own refugee camp in Rafah. Entire neighborhoods simply  no longer exist, while neighborhoods in the proximity quickly become ghost towns as the “seam line” of the row of houses incrementally shaved away by the Israeli occupation bulldozers gets nearer. UNRWA is in the midst of building two new refugee camps for the refugees from these camps. Many of these people are also refugees from Sharon’s Blitzkreig through the Palestinian refugee camps in 1970, in his attempts to squelch yet another popular uprising.

The statistics documenting the incremental destruction of the Palestinian economy and indeed society throughout the occupied territories is shockingly frightening, yet continue to accumulate with no one stopping their horrifying repercussions: Unemployment is estimated at 65%; 80% of the population lives on less than 2$ a day; 30% of children under 5 years of age suffer from chronic malnutrition, 21 % from acute malnutrition; 45% of children under 5 and 48% of women of childbearing age suffer from anemia; Malnutrition rates are as bad as those in sub-Saharan Africa.

Within this context, Palestinians are forced to listen to the sick suggestions of people like Israeli Minister of Tourism Gideon Ezra, who recently proposed bringing delegations of foreign tourists to take tours along the 700 km length of the new ‘separation wall’. “The only thing we need to do is to get the tourism agencies pictures of the wall in East Jerusalem for their tourism publications”, Ezra reportedly told a meeting of ministers. (Al Quds 19/7/2004.)

Can anyone blame the logic of the Abu Rish Brigades for thinking that if they kidnap foreigners, at least someone will care, because the sense of abandonment and silence from the international community and the PA itself is simply too deafeningly loud to be comprehended?

VI.  The Composition of Resistance

Attention should be paid to the composition of the groupings themselves who have today begun to take the initiative. The Jenin Martyrs Brigades; the Abu Rish Brigades; the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades; the Popular Resistance Committees - all of these groupings are marked by several factors. Virtually all of them have strong Fateh affiliations, many of whose members at one point or another may have even worked for the security agencies during the Oslo period. Many represent a new generation of Fateh cadre who today clearly reject the role carved out for Fateh beneath Oslo, and have united with other resistance fronts. In so doing they would like to think of themselves as the shurafa’ or “virtuous ones”, borrowing symbols to uphold this image (the Martyrs of [the battle of] Jenin, the Martyr Abu Rish), and whose responsibility it is to marginalize – by force if necessary – the corrupt (al fasideen). Many of them are also led by former activists from the first Intifada, and graduates of the Israeli prison industry.

Finally, they are also all primarily refugee groupings. As such they represent the continuity of what has been the largely untold history of the Palestinian national movement: that it is the refugees who are the engines of revolutionary change, holding the key to present and the future.

VII. Zionist Intentions

Israel’s ruthless suppression of the Intifada has revealed its intentions from the very beginning: To cunningly manipulate the situation on the ground to enable the implementation of wider historical Zionist goals. The construction of the Wall in the West Bank represents the final stages of consolidating the Bantustan plan, which was the goal of the Oslo Accords from the first place, and was outlined as early as the Alon plan published in 1967. This plan calls for the annexation of wide areas of the West Bank, and the creation of isolated pockets of sovereignty in the areas of Palestinian concentration  where the civil affairs of the local occupied population can be administered by an intermediary party. The Alon plan envisioned Jordan and Egypt playing this intermediary role. Oslo foresaw that role played by the PA.

Today we are witness to an ambiguity as to who precisely Israel will choose to play this role – but not regarding if this role will be played at all. The argument vacillates it would seem between the PA itself (who many inside the Israeli political establishment now argue is “not a partner”) and a return to the original vision of the Alon plan with the intervention of Egypt and Jordan. A third option now seemingly emerging includes the creation of a hybrid authority between Egypt and Jordan, together with subcontracted Palestinian security and economic elites.

Evidence of these scenarios is quickly emerging on the ground. The hullabaloo surrounding the unilateral disengagement plan from Gaza, is preceded by much talk and shuttle diplomacy involving Egyptian Intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, who has offered “to train Palestinian police forces” upon the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Jordan has likewise offered their ‘services’ for the areas Sharon will supposedly withdraw from in the West Bank. In fact, a delegation of five high level Jordanian military officers visited Jenin on 11 June, accompanied by British security personnel, meeting with junior Palestinian security officials. (Arnon Regular “Palestinians accuse Jordan of sending officers to W. Bank”, Haaretz 12 June, 2004).

Palestinian factions on the ground privy to these developments, issued a joint statement strongly opposed to the “security role” proposed for Egypt and Jordan in the occupied territories. The statement signed by Fatah, Hamas, the Popular and Democratic Fronts and other Palestinian political groupings declared, “We are amazed by, and deplore, the talk of a ‘security role’ for some Arab parties in Gaza and the West Bank, because our people expect the Arab nation to act according to the logic of supporting the Palestinians and not the logic of ‘security’, which cannot be used with regard to the Palestinian people defending its land and its holy places. The references [to security] turns things on their heads, making the problem the Palestinian people and not the occupation.” (“Gaza's militants oppose Egypt role” Arnon Regular, Haaretz 22 June 2004)

The statement went on to declare that the role envisioned for Egypt and Jordan  was “an attempt to take over the Palestinian problem” and that “the Palestinian people will not accept the logic of guardianship and turning the Palestinians into apprentices.”

Concluding Thoughts

Whatever the scenario being cooked up in backrooms of Washington, Tel Aviv, Amman, Cairo, and Ramallah, the events taking place throughout the Occupied Territories represent the awareness of Palestinian resistance forces on the ground to the various possibilities. And just as the powers that be attempt to turn back the clock to variations of “Jordan/ Egyptian scenarios” today, with some form of Palestinian partnership, grassroots forces are likewise forced to revert to the scenarios of the past, taking inspiration from the era of the pre-Oslo years -  when authority rested with local militias and popular committees of the first Intifada. It was these formations which organized the communities, served their needs, united Palestinian discourse and operated in more revolutionary circumstances (including dealing with alleged collaborators in a less conciliatory manner, to say the least.)

What we have witnessed throughout the Gaza Strip over the past week, and which has already shown manifestations in the West Bank, may indeed represent the accumulation and preparation of these historical dynamics and processes developing further and gaining steam. Much however remains to be seen, including who has the courage to hang around to see them take place.

Bethlehem, Occupied Palestine

22 July 2004

Toufic Haddad is a Palestinian-American activists and writer. He is the co-founder and co-editor of “Between the Lines” magazine and frequent contributor to the International Socialist Review. He can be reached at tawfiq_haddad@yahoo.com