Instead of the breakthrough he had hoped for in nuclear diplomacy
with Iran, Barack Obama has allowed himself to be painted into a
corner. But so, too, have his Iranian counterparts, with neither side
now capable of breaking the deadlock.
Mr Obama, under pressure
from sceptics of engagement in Washington, Paris and Jerusalem, created
an artificial deadline of December 2009 for his diplomatic efforts. The
clock is ticking, warn the hawks, with Iran supposedly racing full-tilt
to build nuclear weapons (although evidence of this remains scant). So
Mr Obama turned a deal to send much of Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched
uranium abroad for processing into a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum.
Iran’s leadership has been unable to accept this, insisting on
renegotiating the terms even as it faces its own internal paralysis.
The US and its allies
are looking at their own measures, targetting Iran’s petrol imports and
access to international trade and investment by threatening
third-country companies that do business in Tehran. Such measures
could, however, provoke a backlash, particularly from countries such as
Turkey and China, which is fast emerging as Iran’s major trade and
investment partner in the energy sector.
Nobody believes Obama would launch military action – or even allow Israel to do so – because at best it would set back Iran’s programme by a few years, while risking setting the region ablaze and imperiling US missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some in Washington now see a nuclear-armed Iran as inevitable.
So how did a president who promised a new dawn of diplomacy find himself stuck in the same dilemma as his predecessor?
Two
reasons come to mind: nuclear diplomacy has been eclipsed by the most
traumatic domestic political crisis to have gripped the Islamic
Republic in its 30-year history; and Mr Obama failed to abandon the
Bush administration’s goal to get Iran to forego all enrichment of
uranium.
But Washington hawks, together with Israel, Britain and France, say
even peaceful enrichment capability gives Iran the wherewithal to make
a bomb, and is therefore intolerable. And Mr Obama wasn’t about to pick
a fight on the end goals when he launched his much-maligned engagement
policy.
That may have been unfortunate, because different end
goals helped to scupper the Tehran research reactor deal. The
administration’s key goal, as the National Security Adviser Jim Jones
put it, was “to get 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium out of
Iran”. By removing three quarters of Iran’s stockpile – which
hypothetically could be reprocessed to create a single nuclear weapon –
western powers saw the deal as giving them more time to persuade Iran
to forego enrichment altogether.
The
Iranian side was the first to publicly propose swapping its
low-enriched uranium for fuel, and when the framework for the deal was
agreed at talks in Geneva and Vienna, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his
supporters boasted at home of a great victory. The deal, they said, had
forced the West to buckle and tacitly accept Iran’s right to enrich
uranium.
Mr Ahmadinejad suddenly found
himself paralysed by the regime’s internal dynamics, unable to say yes
or no to the West. Tehran’s equivocation was taken as gamesmanship by
western powers, resulting in new condemnation and sanctions threats,
met with more bluster and empty threats by Mr Ahmadinejad.
Still, talks could produce agreement on measures within the NPT framework to strengthen safeguards against Iran weaponising nuclear material. That remains a highly desirable goal, even if getting there would involve a long and painstaking process. Mr Obama would do well to toss out that “ticking clock”, a device manufactured by those goading him towards a confrontation he knows would be disastrous. Considering the alternatives, the latest Nobel Peace laureate should be ready to give serious diplomacy with Iran all the time it needs.