Are Pakistan’s Strategic Nuclear Assets Threatened by Terrorists?

February 22, 2010, Axis of Logic -As recently as in August 2007, USAF lost track of six Advanced Cruise Missiles armed with 150-kiloton nuclear warheads for 36 hours. These missiles were loaded onto wing launch pod of a B-52 H Bomber at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, were improperly and illegally flown around the continental US and were eventually discovered in Barksdale AFB in Louisiana.

For 40 years it has been illegal for the military to carry nuclear weapons on bombers over US territory and since 1991 it has been illegal to even load nuclear weapons on a plane. The USAF called it a big "mistake"- the result of "widespread disregard for the rules" regarding handling of nuclear weapons, writes Dave Lindorff.

Ignoring such a breach of nuclear security by the world’s nuclear guru, the United States, its officials, law makers, defence experts and journalists continue to pontificate on threats to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and lecture it on nuclear safety on the grounds of a possible Jehadist takeover.

This unabated outcry ignores assurances by Pakistan that its nuclear safeguards comply with international standards. General Kidwai, who heads the Strategic Plans Division, which is tasked to ensure security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, said to David Sangers of New York Times, “Please grant to Pakistan that if we can make nuclear weapons and the delivery systems, we can also make them safe. Our security systems are foolproof."

Consistent refusal to accept Pakistan’s position should ring alarm bells in Islamabad. Is this an orchestrated effort aimed at targeting Pakistan under a false pretext, just as it was done in Iraq?

Living in the mountains and caves of Tora Bora, OBL could not be accused of possessing WMDs but he could certainly be accused of ‘having an interest in acquiring them’. The supposed meeting (of which intelligence reports were “frustratingly vague” - George Tenet, CIA Chief) of a renegade Pakistani nuclear scientist, Bashiruddin Mahmood, with Al Qaeda leaders was used as ‘proof’ of this interest. And since Pakistan happened to be the nearest destination where nuclear weapons could be found and since a band of rag tag militants from Pak-Afghan border areas had created an environment of terror inside Pakistan, a picture perfect theme was presented: ‘Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was at risk of being grabbed by the Jihadists for use by Al Qaeda against the West’. “Experts” such as Seymour Hersh also rushed to support the thesis.

The story line is ridiculous. Every one, barring some nuclear and terrorism experts and journalists in Washington, understands that due to the high level of difficulty in acquiring and using nuclear weapons, very few terrorist entities are capable of or have shown significant interest in seeking nuclear weapons or material. There is no conclusive evidence that Al Qaeda is one of them. In fact, chemical and biological weapons are far easier to produce, transport and use and are therefore the weapons of choice for the terrorists.

Western media and disinformation

To spread doubts about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, the western media and experts frequently advance the arguments that: Pakistan is not a viable state; Pakistan government will capitulate to the terrorists; Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are in danger of falling into terrorists’ hands; The A.Q. Khan episode could be repeated, etc. Interestingly, however, they shy away from addressing the questions: Are the terrorists trained and equipped to snatch and transport fissile materials or the bomb? Where is the evidence that Pakistan is about to collapse? Where is the Al Qaeda’s team of nuclear scientists standby to take over nuclear facilities once Pakistan collapses? And how will the terrorists transport these nuclear weapons to the US and launch them?

David Sanger writing in New York Times (January 11, 2009) quoted Graham Allison, supposedly a nuclear expert, as having said: “When you map W.M.D. and terrorism, all roads intersect in Pakistan." Though he concedes that "The nuclear security of the arsenal is now a lot better than it was” he goes on to say: “But the unknown variable here is the future of Pakistan itself, because it's not hard to envision a situation in which the state's authority falls apart and you're not sure who's in control of the weapons, the nuclear labs, the materials".

Bradford University’s Shaun Gregory, currently Director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the University of Bradford (UK) and formerly a visiting fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies in Islamabad and at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis in New Delhi, writing in West Point's Counter Terrorism Center Sentinel, without citing any evidence, claims that: “Pakistan’s nuclear facilities have already been attacked at least thrice by its home-grown extremists and terrorists over the last two years.” He goes on to conclude that “The challenge to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from Pakistani Taliban groups and from al-Qaeda constitutes a real and present danger”.

Sadly, such assessments are either biased, based on disinformation acquired from vested interests or deliberate attempts to distort public opinion. At other times these result from paranoia. This rush to unsubstantiated judgment only shows how ill-informed and myopic some American experts and intellectuals can be.

Is Pakistan a viable state?

Despite bad governance during 62 years of its life, the viability of this nation of 170 million has never been in doubt, even under the worst of circumstances. On the contrary it shows promise. It has a strong agricultural base and is self sufficient in food. It has an aggressive entrepreneurial class, a vibrant industry and efficient workforce. Its roller coaster economic performance notwithstanding, its growth rate until recently stood at an impressive 7.5%, behind China and India, when the world economy was in doldrums. Pakistanis are fiercely nationalistic and loyal to their country and have always rallied behind their nuclear-armed million strong defence forces in times of crisis, which are counted among the best in the world. If these factors do not make a nation viable, what does?

There has never been nor is there today any danger of Pakistan’s collapse or of the country falling to the terrorists.

Militancy in Pakistan

Contrary to Western perception, Pakistan is a country of moderate Muslims that rejects religious bigotry and extremism and it does not swarm with ultra conservative religious militants. Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center, Washington, correctly says: “Pakistan has not been a revolutionary state to date, and the mullahs have not made deep inroads in the political life of the country”.

What then is this militancy all about? These militants are a hodgepodge group of religious bigots, illiterate, misguided rogue elements from Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan and the remnants of stateless Uzbek, Tajik and Chechen fighters from earlier Afghan wars who style themselves as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (not to be confused with Afghan Taliban who have dissociated themselves from it). They are neither ideologues nor do they fight for a common political cause.

They have been clubbed together and launched into Pakistan by ‘Indo-Zionist’ agencies operating in Afghanistan to advance their political agenda of destabilizing Pakistan through acts of terrorism, killing and injuring multitudes of unprotected men, women and children and challenge the writ of the state.

Had the US been serious about helping to end this terrorism, in no time could it choke terrorist supplies coming from Afghanistan and tell Mossad and RAW to back off. But since it chooses not to, it would be logical to conclude that this is happening with its tacit consent. There may be a method in the madness.

Neither trained nor equipped to breach sophisticated security systems of defense and nuclear establishments, these terrorists limit their attacks to easier high visibility targets, such as main entrances Army’s General HQ, the Ordinance Factory at Wah or the military personnel travelling on the streets.

It is ridiculous to take such attacks as the worst case scenario. But for the corporate media this means more breaking news and more business. For their patrons – those who mastermind these acts, the propaganda serves to convey that power of the security apparatus of the state is crumbling.

Condemned by almost the entire nation and religious leaders of all creeds, they represent a minuscule segment of the population drawing support from a tiny minority of orthodox, uninformed, illiterate and poor tribal and rural populations.

With no capacity to defeat Pakistan Army or conquer Pakistan they do not pose existential threat to society or the state. Mauled in the recent army operations in Swat and South Waziristan and having suffered heavy losses, they are on the run.

Military’s Role

Pakistan Army remains the chief arbiter in matters related to defence. It holds the country together, plays the role of its guardian and savior and deals with external and internal threats. Conscious of the dangerous geopolitical environment, it gives no quarter even to the political government to make strategic mistakes or give undue security related concessions to any one that might endanger state security.

Pakistan Army is the largest military branch in the country. Pakistan Army has the reputation of being powerful, experienced, and professional. Pakistan Army with an active force of 619,000 personnel and 528,000 personnel in reserve makes Pakistan a seventh largest military force in the world. The main responsibilities of the army is to protect the borders, security of administrative areas, and defending the national interests of Pakistan within the framework of its international obligations.

Pakistan Army has a rich combat experience. This comes with fighting multiple wars throughout the short history of Pakistan. Pakistan Army now also specializes in counter-terrorism efforts due to its collaboration in the War on Terror. In addition to its role on the War on Terror, Pakistan Army is also responsible of contributing towards the United Nations peacekeeping efforts. Pakistan Army recently grabbed the title of being the largest active force in the peacekeeping efforts by the United Nations.

Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani currently has the honours to lead this prestigious military organization. Currently Pakistan Army’s active duty personnel as well as the reserves continue to protect our nation day and night from the terrorists and other anti-Pakistani national interests. - Pakistan Defense

Terrorists will seize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons

"This is all overblown rhetoric. Even if the country's leadership were to be incapacitated, Pakistan's protections are so strong that the arsenal could never slip from the hands of the country's National Command Authority”, General Kidwai told David Sangers of New York Times.

Pakistan has successfully put its strategic weapons program under formalized institutional control and oversight. National Command Authority effectively controls, manages and monitors strategic organizations, prevents tangible and intangible transfers or leakage of sensitive technologies and material - measures in line with IAEA safeguards. An over 8000-men strong Security Division secures nuclear assets and materials and guards against malevolent activities. Supported by the strategic forces, it is fully capable of ensuring nuclear security of components even in transit.

Prevention of theft of nuclear assets or fissile material

Like other nuclear states, Pakistan also faces the security challenge of preventing Non-State Actors and terror groups from gaining access to nuclear assets. Its preventive measures are no less effective than those of others.

Commenting on security of nuclear weapons, Congressional Research Service Report (RL-31589) on Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan; observes, “Fissile material components (pits) are thought to be kept separately from the rest of the warhead. Such a physical separation helps deter unauthorized use and complicates theft”.

Pakistan is believed to have incorporated certain technical safety features into the weapon design which coupled with de-mated status of the weapons, wherein the warhead and the fissile core are stored in separate locations, discourages and denies seizure or theft of an intact nuclear device, guards against accidental or unauthorized launch and prevents diversion of fissile material in the form of weapon components.

Pakistan’s nuclear controls also include the functional equivalent to the two-man rule and Permissive Action Links (PALs) that most nuclear states rely on to protect against loss of control, inadvertent weapons use, accidents, and other mishaps.

Pakistan’s nuclear material or radioactive sources have remained safe from theft or pilferage nor has there been any attempt by terrorist elements to gain access to weapons or materials. Lamenting the Western attitude Peter Lavoy (National Intelligence for Analysis) states, “Since the 1998 tests, various pronouncements, publications in the Western press, and events in the region have eroded the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear command and control, overshadowing the efforts that have been made since 1999 to harness a coherent command system to ensure management of its nuclear capabilities….”

Guarav Kampani of Center for Nonproliferation Studies says, “Despite such speculative scenario building among policy and security analysts, there is little public evidence to suggest that the safety or the security of Pakistan’s nuclear installations or its nuclear command and control mechanism was ever in jeopardy from internal political instability or Islamists or terrorists forces inside Pakistan or nearby in Afghanistan, either during the American ‘War against Terrorism‘ in Afghanistan or during the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military standoff.

In their analysis of threats from Islamic fundamentalism, Scott Parrish and William C. Potter of the WMD Commission opined, “……. while many states may view Islamic fundamentalism as a significant threat, there appears to be much less agreement on the nature of that threat and its relationship to nuclear terrorism or proliferation”.

Fears about an internal military coup

After the militancy was routed by the Pakistan Army, one hoped that Western fears would subside. Instead, new doubts surfaced, this time about the possibility of a coup by officers sympathetic to Al Qaeda who could take over nuclear assets. For those who have any idea about how Pakistan’s defence forces are organized, this is an impossibility.

The officer’s cadre of Pakistan Army inherited liberal British traditions. Though in recent years many have shown a leaning towards moderate Islam, which is quite natural, there has been no shift towards fundamentalism. The army remains a highly disciplined force of over half a million personnel, well structured and well organized, and led by a four start general who commands 11 corps and other formations headed by a large number of generals.

The shear size of the service, its command structure, strict adherence to chain of command and established traditions of loyalty to service and the state preclude any possibility of a coup occurring to secure nuclear assets, or succeeding even if an attempt is made. The army high command is careful in ensuring that ideologues and those with radical views do not make it to the middle and senior ranks.

Besides, the disconnect between the regular army officers’ corps and the affiliate bodies of National Command Authority that guard and control nuclear assets, except through an elaborate multilayered institutional mechanism at the very top, would never allow any breach of nuclear security.

Can the terrorists acquire fissile material, fabricate a weapon or use it?
Western concerns revolve around the possibility of seized or stolen materials being used to produce a weapon or use a weapon in ready shape against Western targets. This is also a fallacy.

IAEA experts admit it to be highly unlikely for the terrorists to manufacture a nuclear bomb using fissile materials or successfully detonating an assembled bomb. A May 2004 report by Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom states that nuclear attack would be among the most difficult types of attacks for terrorists to accomplish.

Even if one was to concede for a moment that this is possible, it is naïve to believe that a clandestine organization like Al Qaeda, under attack and on the run, after seizing or stealing hazardous unshielded radio active materials or components, will be able to transport or handle them. It is also inconceivable that they can overcome road blocks such as knowledge of nuclear technology, relevant expertise, diagnostic and testing labs, engineering and industrial facilities that would enable fabrication of a deliverable nuclear device and development of delivery mechanism.

Similarly, even if the terrorists acquire an assembled bomb, there is no way they could carry this hazardous device out of Pakistan by land, air or sea all the way to Europe or America undetected by customs and security check points along the route and activate it without a delivery mechanism and the critical electronic code.

Al Qaeda, or supposedly its local affiliate – the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, is not known to have the requisite capacity or expertise to handle or use nuclear weapons or materials and hence any exercise of seizing or stealing nuclear device/materials would be meaningless for them.

The Dr. A.Q. Khan factor

Pakistan has been making, without success, the case to the American Government that the breach of nuclear security associated with Dr. A.Q. Khan is now history, that Pakistan has come a long way from the early days of 1980s and 1990s when its systems were in infancy and that the command and control system now in place will not allow that to happen again.

But Pakistan continues to be accused of complacency. It is therefore legitimate to ask if other nuclear states have not passed through this phase while developing nuclear safeguards.

The US itself struggled in 1970s and1980s to develop security systems that could adequately protect its nuclear assets, and still fails to ensure full compliance (Cruise missile case cited above). The former Soviet Union’s security system was breached in the 1990s when it collapsed and its nuclear weapons went missing. The Indian nuclear security proved inadequate and its fissile material was stolen. Nuclear security was breached when Israel stole hundreds of pounds of enriched uranium from a US firm in 1964. It was again breached when it hijacked a Liberian ship carrying 200 tons of uranium ore in 1968. Somehow these incidents are not highlighted but hullabaloo continues to be made about Pakistan.

One can go on arguing about the fallacy of Western approach to the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, but will this make a difference? Most likely not! The likes of Seymour Hersh will continue to play on Western fears and poison the minds of the Washington elite.

Shahid R. Siddiqi is an Axis of Logic columnist who lives in Baltimore MD and in Pakistan. He served in the Pakistan Air Force and later joined the corporate sector with which he has remained associated until recently in Pakistan, the US and South Africa where he has held senior positions. Simultaneously, he has worked as a journalist and a broadcaster. He was the Bureau Chief of Pakistan & Gulf Economist, an English weekly published from Karachi (Pakistan). Siddiqi now writes on political and geopolitical subjects and his articles are carried by the daily newspapers such as Dawn and The Nation (Pakistan) and online publications such as Axis of Logic, Foreign Policy Journal, Middle East Times and Globalia.