With its resolution 1892 of 13 October 2009, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) with another year. As a peacekeeping mission Haiti appears to be different from most of the peacekeeping missions deployed in UN history. At least nowadays.

The United Nations’ involvement in Haiti goes back sixteen years ago. Three years before, in 1990, Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected president and his person would dominate politics for a long troublesome period ahead. A former priest, his liberation theology soon gained strong popularity among many Haitians who now had high hopes the country would change for the better. He championed the poor; he championed Haiti but also embodied plain populist politics. Aristide’s words resonated strongly at the end of three decades egregious Duvalier dictatorship. But after Baby Doc, the sun of François Duvalier or Papa Doc, was removed from power, the country fell first into the hands of the military. Aristide’s rise to power in 1990 would neither bring the expected democratic results, as political divisions he had created himself soon prove  to be detrimental to his legitimacy. After his at the time Prime Minister René Préval failed a confidence vote in parliament, Aristide tried to rule alone but was soon overthrown by the military. He went into exile, first in Venezuela, later in the US, and was reinstated by the Americans in 1994.

In 1993 a joint UN-OAS international civil mission was deployed but never really got on its feet and was one year later replaced by a multinational UN force of 20 000 troops. The UN, acting under chapter seven of the UN Charter, decided the mission had to “support the constitutional process in Haiti”, and not the “to facilitate the return of the legitimate authorities” as can now be read on the MINUSTAH website. The consensus might be between those lines of course, as Aristide eventually returned to the presidency with the support of US president at that time, Bill Clinton. UN multilateral forces would then start succeeding each other. Meanwhile, Préval had won his first presidency in 1996 and five years later Aristide would claim presidency again. He had always remained a key player behind the scenes, not to say he was still very much in charge. This time however, the result of the elections was disputed by international observers and political opponents; most of them had decided to a boycott in the course of the run-up. Aristide was nevertheless sworn in after which divide and rule policies started coalescing with growing opposition within the country.

In 2004 Aristide was eventually forced from power and flown into exile. First to France and later to South Africa, where he still lives and recently obtained a Ph.D. The involvement of the US and France in his removal has been highly debated as their intervention was quite unconcealed, to say the least. With its in the meanwhile long standing history of meddling in South and Middle America’s politics and economies, the United States of G.W. Bush would naturally not question itself on that point. Fact of the matter is however that the country was in turmoil and highly divided as students had taken the street against Aristide; with ensuing violence and casualties in its course. Many analyses focus on the interfering of France and the US as a cause of the crisis, but it’s actually safer to say it was more a result of it. Besides corruption allegations Aristide is now also largely reckoned to have provided arms to his supporters and “chimère” in an already heated up environment.[1] A rather inept conclusion for opinion makers who strongly condemn the regular meddling in political affairs by western countries that is. Motives for the latter have however mostly been leftist or socialist regimes threatening the economic interests of the US in Latin America. Moreover, a defiant Aristide always held that he was kidnapped by the imperial forces of the world. But as a Quebec based organization commented on this ideological conundrum: “Should solidarity movements support Aristide because he was punished by the US?”[2] Notwithstanding the left profile of Aristide, the interests were at that time more than likely of another order, the US being within reach of Haitian boatpeople and Haiti being an important transfer destination of Colombian cocaine and Jamaican ganja.

Shipping Aristide out of the country and landing US marines would become the platform for the first MINUSTAH mission in 2004. The security situation of the country and especially the capital had highest priority within its mandate; Haiti showing one of the highest kidnapping rates worldwide. In 2006, Préval was again elected president, first with Alexis as his prime minister, who after the riots against rising food prices in 2008, was replaced by Michele Pierre Louis. The mandate of the UN stabilization mission is broadly aimed at stabilizing the country through strengthening the rule of law. Its military component, as was decided in the last resolution, now lies at 6940 troops; its police component at 2 211 police.[3] As in most other contexts of peacekeeping[4], the UN peace force does however not have to keep warring factions separate on the basis of a peace deal. There was and still is a problem of armed violence and kidnapping but no threat of re-insurgence or coup d’état as Haiti simply doesn’t have organized rebels threatening power. It doesn’t even have an army any longer.

This lack of peace enforcing needs is more than likely the main reason why the mission has become so unpopular nowadays. The question why they are here has become the pet peeve of civil society, opinion leaders and even parliamentarians. And indeed, given the  relatively safe environment compared to a recent past, one can only question why such a large military presence is still needed. However, when talking to people on the street you do often here differing views. The ousting of Aristide has apparently been a traumatic experience for many Haitians who believe the “bandits will come out of the slums to create havoc again”. Another, though false, argument to keep the mission longer  in Haiti points into the direction of jobs provided by MINUSTAH. An announcement of their withdrawal would create much the same feeling as the discovery of a vaccine against AIDS would do for people working at UNAIDS. Overt pro-Minustah opinions are rare, but still shared by a fair amount of people, which is rather surprising given the direction of the public debate.

The extension of the mandate in 2007 was a first step into a different direction. In his report to the Security Council the Secretary General recommends to “decrease the infantry capabilities and enhance the military’s capabilities in border control, mobility and engineering”. He further recommended reducing military presence “in calmer rural and urban areas”. The role of the stabilization mission in the provinces is indeed highly questionable, as the security issue mainly concerns the capital. Inside Port-au-Prince, the most visible achievement is the training of a professional police corps. Police are now visible in the street, women are part of the corps and uniforms and vehicles look brand new. In many Haitian hearts and minds this is far from enough to take away the feeling of having an occupation force on Haitian territory however. The security situation might have improved, but this has not led to better living standards. There is no feeling of economic progress at hand and contrarily to the police; the justice system lags far behind its intended reforms. Meanwhile, the budget for next year’s mission lies at $611 million or $1, 6 million a day. That’s roughly around one fourth of Haiti’s state budget for 2009-2010, of which more than half comes from donors (47%) and loans (12%).

A more dramatic withdrawal of troops is not on the agenda yet; although in the last resolution mention is again made of the intention to reconfigure the force “to better meet current requirements on the ground”. Presidential elections are scheduled for 2010 but as important is the new economic wind blowing through the country. Bill Clinton, appointed this year as UN Special Envoy to Haiti, started a campaign to make Haiti an attractive business destination. It’s food for thought for another post, but fact is that a whole range of investors have now visited the country, exploring investment opportunities through HOPE II[5], a free trade agreement offering duty-free access to the American markets for apparel wholly assembled in Haiti. Many of the visiting foreign investors are Brazilian, the country who also has the lead command over MINUSTAH, as the largest contributing country. This is not to say interests are getting mixed up here, but it is hard to overlook the matter; security being the most important condition for foreign direct investments and the smooth functioning of free trade zones.

Officially, the UN awaits the reinforcement of trained police up until 14 000, a number which should be reached within the next years. But whereas MINUSTAH came to stabilize the country, it now finds itself in an economical deadlock; galvanizing public opinion and therefore running the risk of becoming itself a potential cause for violence and unrest. They have been so already when students took the streets to protest again the presidential hesitations to publish a law on a higher minimum wage. Préval sent the law back to parliament with the result of more violent protests and clashes with MINUSTAH and national police. Ironically, the minimum wage was voted but allowed an exception for subcontractors or foreign investors. It reveals an appealing political concoction in which national leaders are enabled to execute a foreign economic agenda during which they can count on multilateral enforcement troops.

Truth lies in the eye of the beholder, and so has this mix of different agendas and lack of economic progress convinced many Haitians of the uselessness of the MINUSTAH presence in the country. The international community seems to have gotten the point and endorsed early this year a report written by Paul Collier, a leading development economist at Oxford.[6] His idea for foreign investments was picked up by Bill Clinton and finally in all recent UN documents on Haiti. Rapid job creation is now considered the linchpin in addressing the country’s needs. A report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti recommends “exploring ways of making enhanced use of MINUSTAH engineers for greater synergy between the mandate of the mission and the development needs of Haiti”.[7] Although the need for security to be accompanied by social and economic development is recognized in resolution 1892, strong proposals for such synergy have not.

The rising unpopularity of Minustah among Haitians will not remain afloat as was shown before the summer months and is now to a large extend responsible for the many “No!” voices with regard to the idea of massive foreign investment in the country. The problem with that is  not so much the concept of FDI’s themselves but more what can be called the ‘momentum feeling’ of the international community. Achieving sustainable economic growth and development will not be delivered by one magic bullet however, especially not in a place like Haiti, where tomorrow the government might fall making investments suddenly much less likely. Simultaneously, pressure outside the country against MINUSTAH will build up too. In Brazil, many questions are already being raised about the country’s broad involvement in Haiti.

And so the future of Haiti remains unclear, as is always the case with any given country which has a foreign military presence on its soil. The business of developing goes on, with an estimated total of 4000 NGOs in the country. Most disturbingly however, is how in the meanwhile Haiti continues to be the nec plus ultra for an elite of importers with skyrocketing revenues. If in the end this reality is not dealt with, either through overhauling the economy with foreign investments or through clear government-led plans, MINUSTAH might sooner or later get back to its core-business: security.

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[1] The “Chimère” are mostly referred to in this matter. They were urban poor and considered being concentrated in Bel Air, an area close to the presidential palace. Considered as the backbone of Artistide’s support and believed to be responsible for most violence on the streets.

[2] Pierre Beaudet, Haiti, the struggle continues, Z Magazine, 2 October 2005.

[3] The military component are blue helmets from following contributing countries: Argentine (560), Bolivie (209), Brésil (1.281), Canada (5), Chili (501), Croatie (1), Equateur (67), États-Unis d’Amérique (4), France (2), Guatemala (116), Jordanie (722), Népal (1.086), Paraguay (31), Pérou (207), Philippines (156), Sri Lanka (959) et Uruguay (1.140).

[4] UNMIS in Sudan and MONUC in DRC for example.

[5] Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act

[6] Paul Collier, Haiti: from Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security, a Report for the Secretary General of the United Nations, January 2009.

[7] Economic and Social Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti, 29 June 2009, E/2009/105

Source: Eye on Haiti