Afghanistan’s Future Uncertain Since Insurgents Lack One Thing to Defeat U.S. Forces

“I think they’re in the last throes, if you will, of the insurgency.”

-Vice President Dick Cheney

Last week, as the world watched the dismal war in Syria and announcement that South and North Korea may seek a formal peace treaty to replace their uneasy truce, including Pyongyang possibly abandoning its nuclear ambitions; there was more bad news for America’s overstretched military in Afghanistan. Not only did U.S. Marines launch a new attack in the province of Helmand to take back-yes take back-territory previously won, but 2017 was a record year for the highest number of civilian casualties from suicide and complex attacks. The capitol, moreover, remained remaining a top target.

Waged By Few, Dependent On Many
America forces are consequently realizing that insurgency warfare isn’t the only kind of war waged by the few but dependent on the support of many. As more arms and military aid from Pakistan, Iran, and Russia pour into the hands of Afghanistan‘s insurgency, so do thousands of Islamic warriors who want to defeat the United States. Given the usual tactics of ambush and sabotage, supported by espionage, intelligence gathering, and deception, is obviously depriving the U.S. of the chance to overrun a militarily weaker opponent, one more shift among many in counter-insurgency will have to occur.

Not Losing Is Winning
But the idea of a smaller force utilizing destabilizing attacks against a larger enemy is no modern invention, something the Afghan insurgents have mastered. To be sure, as long as they’re not losing they’re winning. The purpose of this defensive stage is armed activity designed to undermine the enemy’s morale. For now, it seems to be working. Not only do Afghan insurgents still control half of Afghanistan, but they’re somewhat free to ambush both Afghan and U.S. forces. For instance, 16 percent of all casualties in the last year-a total of almost 2,000 people, occurred in Kabul, Afghanistan’s capitol.

Rebalancing of Power
A second goal has been met too, a rebalancing of power. In other words, some sources in Afghanistan have noticed that the insurgency has been emboldened and even bolstered by more conventional units. Given President Donald Trump’s “revised” vision for the U.S. war in Afghanistan, sending 3,000 more troops, like most Americans he too shares a collective frustration and sense of impatience. He and most Americans are also disillusioned that a 17-year long foreign policy, which has spent too much time, energy, money, and, most importantly, lives in trying to rebuild countries, is failing.

While Empires Hope, Insurgents Cope
Afghan insurgents, on the other hand, seem more realistic, recognizing their relatively under-resourced forces could never expect a quick victory against their stronger enemies. They’ve consequently met another crucial goal for insurgency warfare: to quickly change tactics and be adaptive to whatever circumstances might come. Indeed, in a time of war insurgencies must always take their lead from the enemy, and when the enemy changes strategy or tactics, the same insurgency must do the same. Afghan insurgents also appear to have a better handle on the terrain and local cultures.

Insurgency Absent of a People’s War
But again, Afghan insurgents still lack one thing that will ultimately defeat U.S. forces. Their protracted warfare, where the enemy is softened up by a series of debilitating small scale reverses, lacks a full-scale counteroffensive backed by local support. As of yet, it doesn’t appear that the Afghan insurgents have won the hearts and minds of a majority of people. Nor are they yet able to launch a full-scale counteroffensives in which mobile conventional forces take on and defeat the enemy. Theirs is instead an insurgency absent of a “people’s war,” not like a fish that swims unnoticed among other fish in the sea.

Afghanistan’s Possible Balkanization
The U.S. is also in a conundrum. With U.S. air strikes killing more civilians, they aren’t the only ones fighting a war of attrition. Neither is theirs a strategy for which there’s no known “moral” counterstrategy. Afghanistan may therefore go the way of Iraq or Serbia. Indeed, Afghanistan may someday have autonomous Pashtuns ruling in the south along Pakistan and the Tajik people in the west bordering Iran. Hazaras and Uzbeks might have their own regions too, in central Afghanistan and the north alongside Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan-all of which these tribes have links with those nations.

Caldron of Boiling Insurgencies
As for U.S. political and military leaders who are hampered by the Afghan insurgents, it might be wise to recall what Giuseppe Mazzini believed. He understood that insurgencies were not only the true method for all peoples desirous of emancipating themselves from a foreign power, but they were invincible and even indestructible. Considering the number of Americans who now feel politically discontented and disaffected from the rest of the economy, including facing the onslaught of inflation and rising income inequality, the U.S. may someday find its own nation a caldron of boiling radical insurgencies.

Dallas Darling is the author of Politics 501: An A-Z Reading on Conscientious Political Thought and Action, Some Nations Above God: 52 Weekly Reflections On Modern-Day Imperialism, Militarism, And Consumerism in the Context of John’s Apocalyptic Vision, and The Other Side Of Christianity: Reflections on Faith, Politics, Spirituality, History, and Peace. He is a correspondent for www.WN.com. You can read more of Dallas’ writings at www.beverlydarling.com and www.WN.com/dallasdarling.)