Because he did not have sufficient funds to develop the Congo, Leopold sought and received loans from the Belgian parliament in 1889 and 1895, in return for which Belgium was given the right to annex the Congo in 1901. At the same time Leopold declared all unoccupied land (including cropland lying fallow) to be owned by the state, and unauthorized private traders were not permitted to operate there; instead, the state gained control of the lucrative trade in rubber and ivory. Much of the land was given to concessionaire companies, which in turn were to build railroads or (as in the case of the Katanga Company) to effectively occupy a specified part of the country or merely to give the state a percentage of their profits. In addition, Leopold maintained a large estate in the region of Lake Leopold II (NE of Kinshasa).

Belgium did not exercise its right of annexation in 1901. But starting in 1904, stories began to emerge from the jungle about cruel treatment of the Congolese under Leopold's watch. These stories began mostly because of the diligent work of two men: Roger Casement and E.D. Morel. Their stories of brutality raised the conscience of the Belgian people and public pressure built. Belgium finally exercised its option, after lengthy parliamentary debates, and in 1908 it relieved Leopold of the territory, establishing the Belgian Congo.
 
When Leopold died in 1909, he had managed to control the Congo basin for almost thirty years. But after the annexation by Belgium, evidence started to emerge of the five-to-ten million forced labourers who died from sickness, hunger and overwork, or who were killed deliberately. It is said that Leopold's policy was to chop off the hands or penises of any African who would not work and to hold hostage the wives and children of wayward workers to coerce them into working long and difficult hours, seven days per week.
 
Leopold knew that Henry Stanley, a Welshman of low degree who passed himself off as American, had an exalted image of himself. So he manipulated Stanley, using him to convince Europe that Leopold's hold on the Congo basin was really a humanitarian necessity because he was keeping the area free from 'Arab slavery'. In fact, there was no Arab slavery; but there was Leopold's slavery. It was only later in his command of this region, beginning in 1904, that the truth began to emerge of whippings, murders, hand amputations, rapes and other mutilations and humiliations foisted on the Congolese by Leopold's local administrators.
 
Most of this history is no longer recalled as its memory is submerged in the miasma of damage done in so many of the European colonies in Africa. And after they began to secure their independence from European masters, the newly freed countries of this continent had far more important issues to address than pointing their fingers backwards. But in Leopold's time, reformers spoke at meetings around the world, letter writing campaigns were conducted, there were commissions who heard testimony, official condemnation came from other governments. Even American author Mark Twain, not a name usually associated with political criticism, wrote an essay called 'King Leopold's Soliloquy' for the Congo Reform Movement in England and the United States. He was blunt and harsh, but apparently not as harsh as the reality of Leopold's rule.
 
After full control of the colony transferred to Belgium, the worst of Leopold's practices gradually diminished. But Congo was still considered to be a chattel, as were its people. The Congolese were given no role in the government or the economy and they became essentially the labour pool for a more benign, but still harsh, master; as is usual in colonial situations, the Africans became the poorly paid and abused workers while white Europeans were the managers.
 
Gradually, rubber played a lesser role in the output of the colony; in 1901, it had comprised 90% of exports but this had dwindled to about 1% by 1930. Instead, mining had become a huge enterprise in Congo and there were mass relocations of the Congolese, some forced, to take up residence near the mining operations; this put additional strains on a weak agricultural sector as young workers abandoned their fields and headed to the urban areas to be near the mines. During the seventeen years ending in 1955, the population of Kinshasa had grown from about 40,000 to 325,000. The city was unable to support this large influx of people and shanty towns grew like the once plentiful rubber vines.
 
The end of Belgian rule was foreshadowed, as was the case for the African colonialism of most European nations, when Christian missionaries became active in the Congo. They helped raise literacy rates and produced a class of at least semi-educated Congolese who were able to see clearly that colonial rule had to end. Still, virtually no Africans received more than a primary-level education until the 1950's.
 
But there had been one man, Simon Kimbangu who was educated by Protestant missionaries in the 1920s and who had started an indigenous spiritual movement. It was not an anti-Belgian movement but the government banned it in 1921 nevertheless and jailed Kimbangu. That action ensured the movement would become more aggressively anti-European and although it took another forty years, Belgium eventually decided that the time had come to leave their colony behind. Their decision was assisted by events in neighboring Middle Congo (now the Republic of Congo) when, in 1958, French president Charles de Gaulle offered the people of that country the opportunity to vote on a question of remaining in an association with France or full independence. The Belgians rapidly lost control of hearts and minds in Kinshasa and, by early 1960, they conceded the independence of Congo.
 
From its earliest days as the homeland of largely Pygmy tribes, the Congo basin has seen about 10,000 years of history. Prior to the coming of the Europeans, there were turf wars and the usual sorts of fights that occur between farmers and pastoralists; but in that regard, this was not different than the history of most of the world.
 
With the advent of white outsiders, however, the people of this region saw a steady slide which eventually pushed them off a precipice when they came under the suzerainty of Leopold II of Belgium. They were humiliated, tortured, mutilated to do the bidding of this man who, at least in retrospect, has earned the condemnation of the world. Even with his death, the government of his homeland softened only the brutality, not the slave-like conditions, so that by the time the Congolese arrived at statehood under their own banner in 1960, the cards had been fully stacked against their success. Later history shows that the cards quickly fell against them.
 
Parliamentary elections in 1960 produced Patrice Lumumba as the new nation's first president, only to have him die in mysterious circumstances within the first year. He was tortured and killed by Congolese troops but there are allegations that his death was arranged by the United States because of his refusal to become a puppet state of either the US or the Soviets. Within a week of independence, the army mutinied and the province of Katanga seceded, with the assistance of Belgium and the US.
 
After the death of Lumumba, a period of instability followed before power was seized in 1965 by Joseph Mobuto, in a coup d'état said to be with the assistance of the CIA. He renamed the country Zaïre and also renamed himself Mobuto Sese Seko wa za Banga, meaning "The all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest leaving fire in his wake."
 
Mobutu ruled for over 30 years. He is said to have turned over and again to policies and practices that would favour the US government and business interests over the needs and interests of his people. He also pillaged the country's treasury. But rebel groups arose to challenge Mobutu's rule and in 1997, power was seized by Laurent Kabila, a former Marxist who led the Alliance of Democratic Forces. During most of Mobutu's rule, the country had been known as Zaïre but in May 1997 Kabila formally changed its name to Democratic Republic of the Congo.
 
On assumption of power, Kabila inherited a country already involved in massive tribal infighting, partly arising because of the influx of refugees in 1994.  His rule was quickly challenged by a Rwanda and Uganda backed rebellion in August 1998. Finally, troops from Zimbabwe, Chad, Angola, Namibia, and Sudan intervened to support Kabila's government. Even though a cease-fire was reached in July 1999 between DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola, Uganda, Namibia, Rwanda and the Congolese rebels, sporadic fighting continued unabated. Kabila was assassinated January 16, 2001 and rule of the country fell to his son, Joseph.
 
Joseph Kabila was successful in negotiating a withdrawal of the Rwandan forces from Congo in October 2002 and, early in 2003, all combatant parties finally came to the table and agreed to cease the fighting. They agreed to set up a government of national unity as a caretaker until democratic elections could be held, although it would be another two years before that would take place.
 
For all the time between 1998 and April 2003, most of the world had no idea anything untoward was occurring in DRC. Media didn't cover it although, to be fair, it is a difficult area to cover because it is largely jungle and forest with only primitive communications and bad roads.
 
Since the departure of the last of the foreign forces from DRC at the end of April 2003, there has been a steady increase in ethnic violence in areas where it is alleged Rwanda and Uganda deliberately incited longstanding ethnic hatred. The violence became so acute that the United Nations finally decided to intervene and has sanctioned a small international peacekeeping force under the direction of France. Local people and area governments appear united in their complaints that the force is too small, that its mandate is too limited and of too short a duration; much criticism has been leveled at the UN for its shortsightedness and many people point to this region as having the potential for genocidal nightmare like that in Rwanda in 1994.

As of this writing, Kabila is gone after ruling the country up to January 2019. United Nations peacekeepers have been in place for 20 years and have only barely managed to keep the peace. In fact, violence is still epidemic - including against the peacekeepers themselves - and there is little reason to suspect that there will be any sudden peace once the UN moves out. Frankly, it seems bizarre that the UN would even consider a withdrawal because the nation is a long way from any kind of peace.

The nation lost between 3.3 and 4.7 million people (a difficult number to quantify in these remote conditions) as a result of the civil war and untold millions in the hundred or so years of colonial or dictatorial rule. Leopold may have been no different than many European monarchs in his longing for colonial wealth; but he made his mark in a much more bloody fashion than most and the land that he called his own for so many years has felt those scars ever since.

Today, DRC is still rife with violence, much of it arising from brutal practices of foreign mining interests - particularly Canadian interests.
 
The brutality still evident in modern day DRC is a lesson well-learned from King Leopold. And the shortsightedness of the UN criticized in 2003 remains. It is beyond belief that the UN can seriously consider that packing up their blue helmets and going home at this time is a good idea.

So here's the article that got my attention:


Is the Democratic Republic of Congo ready for peacekeepers to leave by 2022?

Peacekeeper with the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC MONUSCO/Sylvain Liechti

An independent United Nations (UN) strategic review has recommended that the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) complete a phased withdrawal by 2022. Moina Spooner, from The Conversation Africa, asked Mats Berdal to give his insights into why this is happening and what the implications could be.

Why is the peacekeeping operation coming to an end?
The UN Organisation Mission in the DRC started off as a small observer force in 1999. It was deployed by the UN Security Council to monitor the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed in August 1999. At the time the hope was that this would mark the end of the Second Congo War. It did not. The war was also known as Africa’s World War because, at one stage, it pitted the government of President Laurent Kabila and allied troops from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia against the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy, fronting for forces supported by the governments of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. The war officially ended in 2003.

War and profound insecurity in the eastern part of DRC continued to be the norm after 1999, at a horrific cost to civilian populations. By one estimate, more than 5 million people had died as a result of war and violence by 2008.

Continuing instability and violence led to a deepening of the UN’s involvement. The initial observer force grew in size. It’s now the UN’s largest field operation with an overall strength of about 20 000, including civilian staff.

Over time, it also came to assume a much more ambitious mandate. Changing its name to the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC in 2010, the principal mandate of the mission became two-fold: the protection of civilians and the strengthening of state institutions in the DRC.

The Security Council first called for the withdrawal of the mission – or rather a transfer of responsibilities to the government and the UN country team – in 2015. Since then, every mandate renewal (every nine months) has involved calls for plans to be developed for its withdrawal. In March this year, the Security Council ordered an independent review of how exactly a phased, progressive and comprehensive exit strategy could happen. This was presented to the Council in October.

The argument in favour of a progressive withdrawal has long been that the Congolese government, after years of UN involvement and three presidential elections, must now assume full “national ownership” of the peace and stabilisation process.

But this isn’t the only reason. At US$1.1 billion per year, the mission is an expensive peacekeeping operation, and member states have been anxious to cut costs.

After 20 years on the ground, what did the UN mission achieve?
The UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission’s record of achievement in the DRC is mixed.

The independent strategic review noted “significant peace gains” and that after 20 years of UN peacekeeping some two thirds of the country was “stable”. Presidential elections were also finally held in December 2018. After 18 years as president, Joseph Kabila stepped down and Félix Tshisekedi was voted in as President. This could mean a new political direction that would allow the country to move forward.

But, while a measure of stability has been brought to parts of country, intercommunal violence and internal displacement are widespread in Eastern DRC, connected in part to the struggle over control of natural resources. The number of armed groups in North and South Kivu is now well over 100.

Human rights violations perpetrated by the Congolese Army also continue to be a major problem. This reflects a larger failure, after numerous unsuccessful attempts, on the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC’s watch, to undertake meaningful reforms of the security sector.

The mission’s programmes in support of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups and the reform of rule of law institutions have fared little better. Critically, the drivers of conflict – specifically those related to issues of land tenure and the management of mining and natural resources – remain unaddressed.

Finally, although the recent presidential elections were relatively smooth, Tshisekedi’s position is weak. Loyalists of Kabila’s are firmly ensconced in networks and positions of power, notably within the security sector.

What could the implications of a withdrawal be?
This all depends on the manner in which the withdrawal is organised and implemented. If it is rushed and doesn’t include a clear political strategy and regional diplomatic engagement, it will result in further instability and a recurring protection crises.

The independent strategic review, now before the Security Council, recognises many of the challenges ahead. But it appears overly sanguine about what can be achieved within a three-year period. Given the profound weakness of the Congolese State, especially the failure to reform the security sector, this timetable is likely to become an operational straitjacket and a potential source of instability.

While the political pressure with regard to timelines is understandable, transitions must be based on meeting realistic targets, not on calendar dates. Particular account must be taken of the indisputable risks to civilians of a precipitate withdrawal. This will likely increase insecurity and violence, especially in Eastern Congo.

Above all, the UN must intensify, rather than scale down, efforts to engage with the politics of post-election DRC. It should help the government build legitimate political institutions while harnessing regional, donor and diplomatic support for the consolidation of peace. All of this is likely to take more than three years.

Even if the UN peacekeeping presence is substantially reduced by 2022, it will be vital for the UN and the international community to remain engaged, in some form, in helping consolidate peace after the formal closing down of the mission.


Source URL