The article in the November 14 issue of the New York Times about the extent to which the biotech firm Genetech was able to put their own words into legislators' mouths raises the next logical question: To what extent are corporations in the U.S. actually drafting laws and getting them passed?
We can't deny this is happening, yet few want to talk about it. Tobacco industry documents,
though, show exactly how corporations can and do co-opt legislative
processes from start to finish, and how successful they are at it. Big Tobacco's
success at staving off regulation shows its ability to control
legislative processes. The tobacco industry's pioneering work in this
area has drawn a road map for other industries showing how to
manipulate state and federal legislatures as well.
There are many ways that businesses turn legislative processes to
their own advantage. Certainly they lobby to thwart laws they don't
like, but they also actively draft and push through laws of their own
design, for lots of purposes. Tobacco documents demonstrate this.
Big Tobacco Embraces "Bomb-Throwing"
Starting around the late 1980s, the tobacco industry
made a fundamental shift in its legislative strategy from simply
fighting bills it didn't like, to actively drafting and pushing
legislation designed to head off public resistance to its products.
They called it their "proactive strategy" or "throwing bombs."
They used it to dissipate opponents' resources, harass them, get out in
front of them and keep them from causing more trouble for the industry
-- all tactics which are now part of the playbook for other industries
that have drawn contingents of opponents, like the health insurance
industry, the pharmaceutical industry,
the extractive industries, the plastic bag industry and many others.
Following are on-the-ground examples of how the tobacco industry
applied its proactive legislative strategy.
Tactic #1: If You See a Strong Law Coming, Pass a Weak One
One corporate legislative "bomb-throwing" tactic involves pushing
through weak, ineffective laws designed to head off more restrictive
ones. A Tobacco Institute paper titled "Proactive Legislation" describes the industry's use of this tactic in state legislatures.
In 1988, the Institute noted that strong public sentiment existed in
Colorado for a statewide smoking ban. Support was so strong, in fact,
that even the industry's usual ally, the Colorado Restaurant
Association, supported such legislation. To head off the public's
favored measure, the Institute planned to introduce its own, weak
statewide smoking bill "with moderate provisions" that would
"institutionalize certain smokers' rights and dramatically weaken one
of the strongest statewide GASP [Group to Alleviate Smoking Pollution]
organizations in the country." Big Tobacco planned to hide its efforts
by arranging for unrelated groups -- trade, professional and business
organizations -- to be the bill's primary supporters.
The Institute searched for a friendly legislator to introduce the bill, and identified Colorado Republican legislator Bill Owens
(who went on to become governor) as "a friendly member of the House
Local Government Committee (consistently favorable to tobacco
interests)" who could "offer a substitute bill with desirable
provisions with a good chance of having it adopted and passed out of
committee ..."
The Institute laid out its strategy for getting the bill through the legislature:
"Publicly, tobacco industry advocates should express the
position that NO smoking restriction law is desirable. If pressed,
they should acknowledge that uniform regulation throughout the state is
preferable to the state of confusion which now exists. Privately, our
lobbyists would of course encourage legislators' support of the
substitute [weak] bill."
Through this and other legislative efforts, the Tobacco Institute
staved off a truly effective statewide smoking law in Colorado until
fully 18 years later, in 2006.
Tactic #2: Link to an Emotional Issue
Another way corporations get their preferred laws on the books is to
link their issue to one that people feel very strongly about, and then
leverage that emotion to advance their measure.
Example: Most people strongly oppose discrimination in the U.S. The Tobacco Institute
harnessed those feelings to pass laws protecting smoking by portraying
smoking as a trait, or a human characteristic, rather than a behavior.
A 1990 letter by Tobacco Institute
lobbyist Stan Boman discusses passing "smokers' rights" legislation in
Oklahoma. In the letter, Boman portrays smoking as a personal trait,
instead of a behavior, by opining that employers who require employees
to be nonsmokers subject smokers to "spiteful and unreasonable
discrimination in employment practices." Boman wrote that the industry
felt "something must be done" about this situation, and added, "as a
result, non-discrimination legislation [protecting smokers] has been
introduced in 27 states and passed in nine of them." Thus, by 1990 the
tobacco industry got laws passed protecting smoking behavior in fully
one-third of the states in which they attempted to do so, and were
continuing to push for similar laws in the remaining states.
Tactic #3: Introduce bills purely to make opponents waste resources playing defense
In Rhode Island in 1990, the industry planned
to introduce a "proactive" bill to create uniform sales, sampling and
vending machine regulations, and which would also "preempt local
ordinances and forbid bans." The primary purpose of their measure was
to "cut off the possibility" that citizens could enact bills regulating
tobacco more strictly. An Institute report describing the plan gives
away the strategic nature of this bill:
"This legislation is unlikely to be enacted; it is
intended to dissipate the energies of the anti-tobacco forces and put
them on the defensive."
Similarly, a 1994 Philip Morris (PM) memo written by Ellen Merlo, PM's Senior Vice President of Corporate Affairs, shows
that PM has abused state legislative processes purely to harass
opponents. Merlo describes how PM combatted local smoking restrictions
and increased cigarette taxes in California in 1994. PM's strategy was
to "create a flurry of legislative activity to confound the antis
[public health advocates] by introducing various bills and measures to
put them on the defensive ..." Merlo's words show that PM would tie up
state legislatures with essentially meaningless bills solely to
antagonize public health advocates (the "anti's"). She also
demonstrates PM's confidence in its ability to introduce legislation at
will. This memo was circulated to executives at the highest levels of
Philip Morris.
Tactic #4: Introduce "Trojan bills"
The tobacco industry will also hide its preferred measure in a bill
about a completely unrelated topic, and many legislators will have no
idea about the origins and real purposes behind these "Trojan" bills.
Example: in 1995, Philip Morris disguised "smokers' rights"
legislation as property rights legislation. First, PM framed smoking
restrictions as a "government taking" of private property. This allowed
them to link smoking to property rights -- a hot-button issue,
particularly in western states. A telltale 1996 PM email shows that PM
introduced a "property rights" bill that would effectively prevent
smoking bans statewide. Incredibly, PM's bill did not even contain the
words smoking or tobacco. Instead, the wording prohibited placing
"burdens on individual property owners to achieve general public
purposes," which included protecting public health. The bill put the
burden of proving harm to public health on local government, an
expensive obstacle to enacting a smoking ban. Pam Inmann, PM's Colorado lobbyist, emailed PM executives in 1996 about the "takings" bill that the company successfully introduced in Colorado's legislature. Inmann wrote:
Tomorrow barb will fax you a cc [copy] of SB 69 [a
private property "takings" bill]...I think this will work on smoking
bans in the future..."
PM's takings bill was introduced and was passed by Colorado's Senate
and House of Representatives, but was ultimately vetoed by
then-Governor Roy Romer.
Tactic #5: Analyze and Exploit Every Part of a Legislator's World
A 1993 PM presentation called Grasstops Government Relations
is a tutorial about how PM influences legislators. PM uses an
"Influence Wheel" that contains sections representing legislators'
ideology, beliefs, media, special constituents, voters, pet causes and
charities, to show how the company scrutinizes every facet of a
legislator's world and how the company influences them at every
possible juncture. For example, PM helped legislators create and
strengthen alliances with individuals and groups to reinforce their
hold on office; indulged their desire to be associated with good works
and helped them be seen at sporting and cultural events. PM even
investigated legislators' spouses' favorite charities and
donates to them. PM indulged legislators with trips to "promotional and
cultural events" in nice locales, including foreign countries. In
short, PM finds every possible way to help legislators get what they
want -- and believe they need -- thus earning their loyalty.
At the same time, Grasstops Government Relations shows how
PM shifts the focus of tobacco issues to help legislators avoid
discussing tobacco issues in a framework of public health:
"...Finally, we try to change the focus on the issues.
Cigarette tax become[s] an issue of fairness and effective tax policy.
Cigarette marketing is an issue of freedom of commercial speech.
Environmental tobacco smoke becomes an issue of accommodation.
Cigarette-related fires become an issue of prudent fire safety
programs. And so on."
I am certain that this list represents only the tip of the iceberg
of legislative tricks used by industry to manipulate legislators and
legislation. The tobacco industry's influence on lawmaking in the U.S.
has been pervasive, and shows that corporations draft their own
legislation, get their preferred measures introduced at will, and
obtain passage for them at a remarkable rate.
How Many of our Laws May Have Been Drafted and Passed by Corporations?
There is probably no easy way to quantify corporate lawmaking in the U.S., but industry documents give us an idea of its extent.
PM sets its goals high when working to enact laws of its own making. In 1994, Ellen Merlo of PM gave an internal speech
in which she stated PM planned to enact laws in all 50 states that
would stop cities and towns across the U.S. from passing their own
smoking laws. In her speech, Merlo boasted that by October of 1994, PM
had successfully passed its laws in 29 states -- well over half the
country.
This article considers the manipulative activities of just one
industry, and over just a few years. Many other industries now have
more than enough money to exert the same influence -- the
pharmaceutical industry, the insurance industry, the chemical industry,
the food and drink industries, and so many more. I know of no study
that has examined the origins of state and federal laws to find out
just how many came about due to corporate conniving.
Corporations will continue to wrest control of our country's
legislative processes away from the people and co-opt it for
themselves, but we out number them. It's time to join together to
ensure, as Abraham Lincoln so memorably said in his 1863 Gettysburg
Address, that "government of the people, by the people, for the people,
shall not perish from the earth."
PR Watch