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US legislation authorises military action against the LRA in Uganda
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By Samar Al-Bulushi
Pambazuka News
Sunday, Mar 28, 2010
Despite harsh condemnation from US legislators in response to Uganda’s
draft bill criminalising homosexuality, the Senate passed a bill in
mid-March that will prop up Uganda’s government by authorising military
action in the highly volatile region of Central Africa. Introduced last
May, the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda
Recovery Act aims to ‘support stabilisation and lasting peace’ in
Northern Uganda – the site of conflict between the Ugandan government
and the rebel group Lords Resistance Army (LRA) since 1986. The bill
calls for an assessment of options through which the United States,
working with regional governments, ‘could help develop and support
multilateral efforts to eliminate the threat posed by the Lord’s
Resistance Army’.[1]
While the bill allocates funding towards humanitarian aid and
post-conflict justice and reconciliation processes, the primary focus
in Congress is on a military strategy to ‘apprehend or otherwise
remove’ LRA leaders. And despite the bill’s requirement that the
government of Uganda commit to ‘transparent and accountable’
reconstruction efforts, it makes no similar demands of a military
operation, thereby giving a green light to extrajudicial executions.
With recent reports of US military drones flying over Mogadishu to help
the transitional government in Somalia to track the Shabaab resistance,
we can expect a similar ‘multilateral’ approach to eliminating the LRA.
The bill emerged in response to aggressive calls, not from the Ugandan
people, but from a handful of US-based organisations. Much like the
Save Darfur Coalition has done with Sudan, groups like the Enough
Project, Invisible Children, and Resolve Uganda have developed an
influential voice in Washington that speaks on behalf of Africans
thousands of miles away, calling for the US to facilitate ‘peace’ in
conflict zones through military intervention.
The emergence of these organisations roughly coincided with the
little-noticed birth of AFRICOM, the US military command for Africa.
Announcing the creation of the command in February 2007, President Bush
stated that AFRICOM ‘will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and
security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of
development, health, education, democracy and economic growth in
Africa.’[2] While Africans have expressed grave concern over the
political and economic interests behind a US military presence on the
continent[3], the US advocacy groups campaigning to end conflict in
Africa have been among AFRICOM’s most ardent supporters.
In a statement released just before Obama took office, Resolve Uganda
and the Enough Project made an explicit call for a military operation
to eliminate the LRA: ‘The United States military has strong ties to
the Ugandan military and has assets based nearby at the U.S. military
base in Djibouti. The incoming Obama administration should provide
greater intelligence and logistical support and should consider direct
support to, and collaboration with, Ugandan forces on the ground in
direct action against the LRA.’[4] In response to their advocacy
efforts, Senator Russ Feingold stated in March 2009 that the effort to
stop the LRA is ‘exactly the kind of thing in which AFRICOM should be
engaged.’[5]
Yet, in an effort to appeal to a wide audience, the bill’s supporters
are deliberately vague about how exactly ‘peace’ will come about.
Visitors to Invisible Children’s website can give US$5 to ‘rescue the
child soldiers’ and can sign a petition calling on President Obama to
lead an ‘international effort’ to arrest LRA leader, Joseph Kony, and
implement the LRA bill. No information is provided on the content of
the bill, nor is any reference made to military action.
Resolve Uganda says that US policymakers should develop a
‘comprehensive strategy for working with international partners’ to
‘permanently end the LRA insurgency’. One has to dig much deeper on
their website to find reference of a military operation. On the third
page of a memo to civil society partners, it states: ‘The bill makes it
clear that the Obama Administration should consider supporting viable
military actions to protect civilians from LRA violence and prevent
rebel leaders from carrying out further attacks… for any strategy to
end LRA atrocities to be deemed “viable” as required by the bill, Obama
Administration officials will have to explore alternative options
beyond supporting offensives led by weak regional militaries.’[6] Enter
AFRICOM with its ‘assets’ in Djibouti to lead an offensive with
US-trained Ugandan special forces.[7]
On its website, the Enough Project references the arrest warrants
issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the top LRA
leaders, but the bill makes no mention of the ICC and none of the
groups have explicitly called for the warrants to be executed. And yet
the ICC’s prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo (along with the Ugandan
minister of defence), attended and addressed participants in a lobby
day organised by Resolve, Enough, and Invisible Children in June 2009
to raise support for the bill.
Why would the head of an ostensibly independent legal body participate
in a political event dedicated to passing legislation that makes no
commitment to upholding his arrest warrants and that leaves the door
open to extrajudicial assassinations? For all its talk of the rule of
law, the US government has never exactly been a friend of the ICC.
Under the Bush Administration, the US aggressively sought out bilateral
immunity agreements with governments worldwide to ensure that Americans
would not be subject to the court’s jurisdiction (and threatened aid
cuts to those who did not comply). Uganda and the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) signed reciprocal immunity agreements with the US in
2003, thereby guaranteeing that the US would similarly shield Ugandan
and Congolese citizens from accountability under international law. In
light of the failure of any of these governments to hold members of
their own armed forces responsible for gross human rights violations,
there is an equally small chance of accountability under domestic law.
The bill’s supporters fail to mention any of this.
The groups are also misleading about the level of support for the bill.
Resolve Uganda refers to a coalition of organisations that includes
groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Uganda.[8] This
‘coalition’ is composed primarily of American and Southern Sudanese
organisations; it includes just two Ugandan and one Congolese group
(most Congolese are wary of any Ugandan-led operation because of the
Ugandan Army’s history of violence and exploitation in eastern
Congo[9]).
In the US, a number of groups with greater historical ties to the
region raised alarm bells about the bill’s military component. In June
2009, the Africa Faith and Justice Network (AFJN) submitted a petition
to Congress against military involvement. It stated that ‘allowing
AFRICOM to assist in an attack against the LRA is a recipe for
disaster’, citing ‘a strong outcry from many religious groups and
communities in northern Uganda, including several AFJN members’ who are
against a military operation.[10] In response to these concerns, minor
changes were made to the bill, such as a stipulation that military
action would only be pursued ‘if there continue to be no viable efforts
to achieve a genuine negotiated solution.’[11] But without further
clarification on who determines what constitutes ‘viable efforts’ or a
‘genuine’ solution, it appears that the US government will retain the
authority to pursue a military strategy. An AFJN staff member, has in
fact, privately confirmed that the focus of discussions in Congress
remains a military operation.[12]
Outside of Resolve Uganda’s website, where their names are listed, none
of the African groups are vocalising any continued support for the
bill. In Acholiland, the heart of the conflict in northern Uganda,
where the ethnic Acholi people have suffered attacks from both the LRA
and the government’s army, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace
Initiative expressed strong concerns about the military component of
the bill and called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. ‘We
applaud the commitment of the bill [in the US Congress] to bring about
stability and development in the region’, said the leaders in June
2009. ‘However, we as the Acholi religious leaders whose primary
concern is the preservation of human life, advocate for dialogue and
other non-violent strategies to be employed so that long term
sustainable peace may be realised.’
James Otto of Human Rights Focus, a local NGO based in northern Uganda,
says that lobbying by groups like Resolve is helping prop up a
government that has long favoured a military solution. Emphasising his
organisation’s long-standing insistence on dialogue, he also expressed
concern about the children who were forcibly abducted by the LRA
getting caught in the crossfire of a military operation. ‘I don’t know
what kind of charity organization would support violence,’ he said.
Referring to the funding in the bill allocated towards humanitarian and
justice efforts, Otto said that no amount of money could replace the
lives lost in a military offensive.
Ugandan opposition to a military solution stems from their experience
of numerous counter-insurgency efforts that have not only failed to
bring peace, but have led to the displacement and death of thousands of
civilians. In 1996 the Ugandan army rounded up and forcibly relocated
civilians in the north into what it called ‘protected camps’, claiming
that this approach would make it easier to shield them from LRA
attacks.
In 2002 the government launched a counter-insurgency attack dubbed
‘Operation Iron Fist’, which failed to crush the LRA. In the process,
the government again ordered civilians to move to the camps,
threatening military action against those who did not comply. By June
2003, it was estimated that over one million civilians were in
internally displaced camps. Over-congestion, malnutrition and lack of
water made these camps literal death traps – at the height of the
crisis in 2005, Uganda’s Ministry of Health reported that up to 1,000
people were dying per week from preventable diseases.[13] Human rights
groups have documented accounts of Uganda People’s Defense Forces’
(UPDF) involvement in rape and murder of civilians found outside the
camps.[14] Between the forced displacement, UPDF abuses and failure to
protect civilians from LRA attacks, some have accused the Ugandan
government of a calculated attempt to destroy the Acholi people.[15]
Following the breakdown of peace talks in late 2008, the National
Security Council authorised AFRICOM to support a military operation
(one of the first publicly-acknowledged AFRICOM operations) against the
LRA, which was believed to be in the Congo at the time. AFRICOM
provided training and US$1 million in financial support for ‘Operation
Lightning Thunder’ – a joint endeavour of the Ugandan, Congolese and
South Sudan forces in Congolese territory launched in December 2008 to
‘eliminate the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)’.
According to the United Nations, the offensive ‘never consulted with
partners on the ground on the requirements of civilian protection.’[16]
Stretching over a three-month period, it failed in its mission and the
LRA scattered and retaliated against the Congolese population; over
1,000 people were killed and up to 200,000 displaced.[17]
Despite the severe civilian casualties and the Ugandan government’s
poor human rights record, Resolve Uganda, the Enough Project and
Invisible Children have since been lobbying Congress for a renewed
military operation to help the Ugandan government ‘finish the job.’[18]
‘Given the close U.S. relationship with key actors in ‘Operation
Lightning Thunder’—in particular Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and
Southern Sudanese President Salva Kiir—the United States is uniquely
placed to support better targeted military efforts’, wrote Enough and
Resolve Uganda in a joint policy brief in January 2009.[19]
Beyond the rhetoric, what do we actually know about what this kind of
military operation would entail? The latest reports indicate that the
LRA is scattered across eastern DRC, the Central African Republic and
southern and western Sudan. As the LRA operates in small groups moving
between each of these countries, the potential for a protracted
military campaign affecting thousands of civilians is high. In January
2009, the Canadian-based Heritage Oil Corporation announced what could
be the largest onshore oil discovery in Sub-Saharan Africa on the
Uganda/Congo border – the terrain where the proposed military operation
would occur.[20] Disputes have already surfaced between the two
governments at the border, and are likely to escalate with a heavier
military presence to track the LRA.
And while the US lobby groups characterise LRA leader, Joseph Kony, as
the spoiler who refused to sign a final peace deal, they fail to
acknowledge that the Ugandan government itself has not yet signed the
agreement. President Museveni has consistently thwarted peace efforts
(1985, 1994, 2003) when he sensed that they did not serve his
interests, which centre primarily on maintaining power. He has used his
close ties to Washington to build and maintain a favourable image,
hiring the DC lobby firm The Whitaker Group (TWG) to do his bidding.
Between November 2006 and June 2007, Museveni paid the firm US$75,000
to publicise the government's commitment to peace.[21] Jendayi E.
Frazer, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
under Bush, now works for TWG under a US$1 million contract with the
Ugandan Ministry of Finance.[22] In an August 2009 Wall Street Journal
editorial entitled ‘Four Ways to Help Africa’, she called on President
Obama to ‘galvanize U.S. efforts to end the militia violence of Rwandan
and Ugandan rebel groups still operating in the Congo.’[23] As a paid
consultant for the Ugandan government, Ms Frazer is clearly suggesting
Museveni’s preference for a military solution.
Indeed, the protracted conflict with the LRA has not only helped the
Ugandan government justify exorbitant defence spending levels, but has
also created a constituency within the military that benefits from its
continuation.[24] The ‘global war on terror’ provided a convenient
basis to expand military spending. After 9/11 President Bush designated
the LRA as a terrorist organisation and Museveni followed suit with his
own draconian anti-terrorism law in 2002. In 2003 the US awarded Uganda
US$200 million to beef up its counter-terror work[25] and the defence
department has since trained the Ugandan military for counter-terrorism
operations.[26] This level of support has enabled Museveni to crack
down on opposition in the name of fighting terror, with the president
labelling those who question the government’s policies and actions as
‘LRA collaborators’.
As American military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan should remind
us, neither peace nor justice can be brought about through force. The
LRA is a symptom of deeper national problems that are best addressed by
Ugandans themselves, and that – without the diversion of renewed
conflict – are likely to gain more attention in the lead up to the 2011
presidential elections in Uganda. While the US advocacy groups might
have us believe otherwise, Ugandans are not helpless victims awaiting
rescue. They are actively mobilising for change on a vast array of
issues, from LGBT rights to corruption, electoral reform, political
representation, land, poverty, HIV/AIDS and violence. Many of them
point to the ways in which the country’s anti-homosexuality bill – the
product of external ideological influences – has focused attention on
questions of morality and diverted energy away from broader questions
of civil liberties and representation.[27] Propping up a militaristic
regime risks not only exacerbating the conflict, but also deflecting
attention away from crucial discussions and demands for internal reform.
NOTES:
[1] See 'Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009.'
[2] The White House Office of the Press secretary, ‘President Bush
Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa’,
6 February 2007.
[3] See ‘African Voices on AFRICOM’.
[4] Resolve Uganda and Enough Project, ‘No Excuses: The End of the Lord’s Resistance Army is in Sight’, Policy Brief, January 16, 2009.
[5] See the Congressional Record.
[6] See democracyinaction.org
[7] See Human Rights Watch report on US training of Ugandan forces.
[8] Resolve Uganda website, ‘32 Groups Applaud Introduction of Landmark Legislation to Protect Civilians from LRA’.
[9] See, for example, United Nations, ‘Report
of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo’, 12 April 2001. In 2005, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) found that Uganda was liable for massive human rights abuse in
Eastern Congo. Although the ICJ instructed the Ugandan government to
provide the Democratic Republic of Congo US$10 billion in compensation,
it has yet to comply.
[10] Africa Faith and Justice Network website.
[11] Resolve Uganda
[12] Phone interview 17 February 2010.
[13] See Republic of Uganda Ministry of Health, ‘Health and mortality survey among internally displaced persons in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts, northern Uganda’.
[14] See for example, Human Rights Focus (HURIFO), ‘Hidden War,
Forgotten People: War in Acholiland and its Ramifications for Peace and
Security in Uganda,’ October 2003. See also Human Rights Watch,
‘Abducted and Abused’ July 2003.
[15] Ibid, p.152. See also Olara Otunnu, ‘The Secret Genocide’, Foreign Policy, July/August 2006.
[16] See "Alarm as Congo villagers form Militia groups", the East African, January 2010.
[17] See Ronald Atkinson, ‘Revisiting Operation Lightning Thunder’, The Independent, 9 June 2009.
[18] See ‘Finishing the Fight against the LRA,’ Enough Strategy Paper, May 12, 2009.
[19] See "The end of the Lords Resistance Army is in Sight", Resolve Uganda, January 2009
[20] Times Online
[21] See ‘Country Paid Over $75,000 for a 'Good Image' Letter to U.S. Congress’ All Africa, February 2008.
[22] Africa News Online.
[23] See Samuel Olara, ‘Blood Money: Jendayi Frazer’s Apologia for Dictators’, Black Star News; and zimbio.com .
[24] See HURIFO, ‘Hidden War, Forgotten People,’ p.8
[25] New Vision, Monday, 7 July 2003.
[26] See Kevin J Kelley, ‘Uganda: Big U.S. Military Exercise for Northern Region’, East African, 12 October 2009.
[27] See Solome Nakaweesi-Kimbugwe and Frank Mugisha, ‘Bahati’s bill: A convenient distraction for Uganda’s government’, Pambazuka News, 16 October 2009.
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