The compromise agreement on refueling the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
mediated by Brazil and Turkey is a truly big deal. From a "macro"
perspective, this is a watershed event: two rising economic powers from
what we condescendingly used to call the "Third World" have asserted
consequential political and strategic influence on a high-profile
matter of international peace and security. Furthermore, they have
done so in a manner that politely but clearly signals that rising
powers will no longer let the United States unilaterally define the terms for managing major challenges to global security.
We will have more to say about the global strategic importance of
the Brazil-Turkey TRR deal in coming days. At this point, we would
note that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's ham-handed statement about the deal to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today
and the Obama Administration's subsequent circulation of a draft
sanctions resolution to the 10 non-permanent members of the Security
Council (including Brazil and Turkey) raises the chances of serious
international backlash against the United States on the issue.
Obviously, the deal is also very important in terms of its
implications for U.S.-Iranian dynamics, on the nuclear issue and
beyond. On these points, we want to highlight an edgy and excellent piece published today by our friend and colleague Rami Khouri, Editor-at-large of The Daily Star
(Beirut) and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy
and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut. Rami
argues that
The political agreement on Iran's nuclear fuel
announced Monday after mediation by the Turkish and Brazilian
governments should be good news for those who seek to use the rule of
law to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. From both the American
and Iranian perspectives, the political dimension of the current
dynamic is more important than the technical one. Also, this accord
should remind us that the style and tone of a diplomatic process is as
important as its substance.
Iran and its assorted
international negotiating partners in the past half decade have not
reached agreement on Iran's nuclear programs to a large extent because
American- and Israeli-led concerns have been translated into an
aggressive, accusatory, sanctions-and-threats-based style of diplomacy
that Iran in turn has responded to with defiance and resistance.
Iran's
crime, in the eyes of its main critics in Washington and Tel Aviv (they
are the two that matter most, as other Western powers play only
supporting roles), is not primarily that it enriches uranium, but that
it defies American-Israeli orders to stop doing so. (The Iranian
response, rather reasonable in my view, is that it suspended uranium
enrichment half a decade ago and did not receive the promises it
expected from the United States and its allies on continuing with its
plans for the peaceful use of nuclear technology -- so why should it
suspend enrichment again?). . .
The political imperative in
the agreement announced this week is clear, and repeats the basic
principles that Iran and American-led negotiators agreed on in
principle last autumn: sending abroad Iran's low-grade enriched uranium
and transforming it into fuel rods for use in Tehran's research
reactor. The political dynamics now should also be clear: Iran is
willing to negotiate seriously and enter into agreements that honor the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty's dictates, if such talks are
conducted in a non-colonial manner and also acknowledge Iran's own
national interests.
The first paragraph of the 12-point
agreement is the most important, with Brazil, Turkey and Iran stating
that: "We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in accordance with the related
articles of the NPT, recall the right of all State Parties, including
the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use
of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment
activities) for peaceful purposes without discrimination." Article 2
speaks of looking ahead to a "positive, constructive,
non-confrontational atmosphere leading to an era of interaction and
cooperation."
These suggest that a win-win option is
available (and always has been, in my view and that of many others in
this region) that respects sovereign rights on nuclear development
while prevents nuclear weapons proliferation. Whether this option will
be pursued reflects political, rather than technical, dictates. The
available signs indicate that the Obama administration remains
committed to its schizophrenic policy of reaching out to Iran while
also sermonizing to it with condescension and even some disdain. This
was most recently reflected in Secretary of State Hilary Clinton's
statement a few days ago, after predicting incorrectly that the
Turkish-Brazilian mediation would fail, "Every step of the way has
demonstrated clearly to the world that Iran is not participating in the
international arena in the way that we had asked them to do, and that
they continued to pursue their nuclear program."
This
presumptuous, aggressive approach has failed to change Iran's nuclear
strategy, while the Turkish-Brazilian approach has been more
successful. The coming days and weeks will clarify if the
US-Israel-led side finally grasps the important political lessons of
the Turkish-Brazilian mediation: Drop the arrogance and double
standards, negotiate fairly and realistically, and accept that Iran is
a power that is at once strong, technically proficient, and proud of
its sovereignty, and on that basis agree to lock in its respect for
existing nuclear non-proliferation standards and conventions.
Rami closes with an important observation about the Middle East's
changing political dynamics and the challenge that poses for the United
States and its allies:
Iran and Turkey represent something novel and
historically significant in the Middle East: Muslim-majority countries
that are politically self-confident and dare to stand up to the United
States, Israel or anyone else who encroaches on what they see as their
strategic national interests. Washington and Tel Aviv remain confused
on how to deal with such new phenomena.
The Obama Administration's initial response to the Brazil-Turkey
nuclear deal suggests that confusion continues to run high in official
Washington.
Monthly Review