Sweden
is bound by different extradition agreements. It is not meant to grant
onwards extradition to a third country without agreement from the
extraditing country. But at the same level of the legal hierarchy there
is a bilateral treaty between the US and Sweden that allows for
extradition without consent from the UK or minimum tests. This is the
temporary surrender/conditional release regime - automatic extradition
on a loan basis. It is highly likely that the United States will soon
request Julian Assange’s extradition from Sweden and this mechanism will
be used while Julian Assange is in Swedish custody.
The
US government is certainly looking at the technical aspects of the two
extradition agreements between the UK and Sweden and then considering
the political and legal atmosphere in both places. - John B. Bellinger
III, former legal adviser to US State Department and National Security
Council
Julian Assange’s Extradition to the United States
There are several main reasons for Julian Assange’s challenge to Sweden’s extradition order. Relevant to this topic, they are:
- Julian Assange has not been charged with any offense.
- Sweden has a bilateral agreement
with the United States which would allow it to surrender Julian Assange
without going through the traditional tests and standards of regular
’extradition’ procedures.
- There are standard EU mechanisms
(such as Mutual Legal Assistance) for Julian Assange to answer any
questions the Swedish government may have. It is disproportionate, and
an abuse, to use extradition proceedings in this manner.
- Extradition law requires a "judicial
authority" (e.g a judge or other independent body) to issue an
extradition warrant, in order to keep the separation between the
executive and the judiciary. It is an abuse to permit prosecutors,
intelligence agents or other officials who are not independent to issue
proceedings.
The concern is that the Swedish case is a holding case
while the Virginian grand jury come forward with an indictment to take
him to America. - Christine Assange
Temporary surrender - under the US-Sweden Extradition Treaty
Most of the attention regarding
Julian Assange’s possible extradition to the US has focused on the EU
agreements that are meant to prevent onward extradition - namely that
the UK Home Office would have to consent to his onward extradition.
Little or no attention has been given in Europe to the temporary
surrender (sometimes called ’conditional release’, see the Panama
example below) mechanism that Sweden established bilaterally with the
United States in their 1984 treaty (TIAS 10812):
VI.
If the extradition request is granted in the case of a person who is
being prosecuted or is serving a sentence in the territory of the
requested State for a different offense, the requested State may:
b)
temporarily surrender the person sought to the requesting State for the
purpose of prosecution. The person so surrendered shall be kept in
custody while in the requesting State and shall be returned to the
requested State after the conclusion of the proceedings against that
person in accordance with conditions to be determined by mutual
agreement of the Contracting States.
Temporary surrender has been incorporated into the EU-US Extradition
and Mutual Legal Assistance agreements entered into in February 2010.
The Council of the EU’s handbook explains temporary surrender in the
following manner:
[Temporary
surrender] facilitates the orderly and efficient prosecution of a
person sought in two jurisdictions by allowing the temporary transfer of
the person to the Requesting State for prosecution, when that person is
subject to proceedings (either prosecution or service of a sentence) in
the Requested State. The transfer is subject to conditions agreed to in
advance of the transfer. - Council of the European Union - Handbook on
the practical application of the EU-U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance and
Extradition Agreements (p. 15)
The US has put what appears to be an expedient de facto extradition in
place that effectively sidesteps traditional extradition safeguards.
The background for this mechanism is to combat serious crimes -
typically drug trafficking, terrorism, and so on - and it has
implemented such innovative mechanisms with several strong allies.
One of the strategic allies
that has implemented these types of mechanisms in the context of drug
trafficking, is Panama: a recently released US embassy cable described
the "conditional release" regime:
use
of Conditional Release, under which the GOP [Government of Panama]
releases to the US a suspect already under arrest in Panama on other
charges. Under this procedure, the suspect is "lent" to the US for
prosecution on the condition that they will be returned for prosecution
in Panama at the end of their sentence. This procedure is much faster
than a formal extradition, and has proven so successful, that DEA
sometimes designs operations to bring suspects to Panama so they can be
arrested in Panama and turned over to US authorities quickly. - US
Embassy Panama Cable, 2008
The Conditional Release
mechanism appears indistinguishable from the temporary surrender
mechanism, apart from the fact that in conditional release the suspect
will serve his/her sentence in the US before returning to the requested
state (in the case above, Panama), while in temporary surrender the US
would have to negotiate with Sweden at what point Julian Assange would
be returned to the requested state for prosecution/serving a sentence.
A research paper prepared
for US Congress in March 2010 by the Congressional Research Service
(’Extradition To and From the United States: Overview of the Law and
Recent Treaties’) does not mention the Conditional Release mechanism in
the report and it appears that little is known about this preferred
method of extradition.
US Embassy contacted regarding temporary surrender/conditional release of Julian Assange
The US Embassy in London was
[contacted by The Guardian newspaper] after readers sought clarification
about the temporary surrender/conditional release mechanism, and
whether the US will employ it in its request to Sweden. The US embassy
declined to give a statement.
Surprisingly prehaps, the
Guardian did not attempt to contact the Swedish Embassy - it is after
all Sweden that is bound by the two potentially conflicting extradition
regimes (under the Framework Directive and the US Extradition Treaty,
respectively) and would be best equipped to address whether it would
treat a ’temporary surrender’ as regular extradition (with its
safeguards). The EU Handbook on the US-EU Extradition Treaty seems to
suggest differently:
The transfer is subject to conditions agreed to in advance of the transfer.
Despite the failure of The Guardian to get to the bottom of this
potentially game-changing issue, the readers’ discussion raised some
important hypotheticals: For example, the reader GregCallus suggested
"this extradition takes place under a European Arrest Warrant [which]
means that (as a matter of EU law) Sweden would be bound by the Article
28.4 rules on seeking permission from the UK (which would be judicially
reviewable). If they tried to ignore those obligations, then a
preliminary reference to the ECJ (on the super-fast track urgent) route
would likely compel them to get the UK’s permission."
However, the question
remains: if the US uses not traditional extradition but temporary
surrender do the presumed safeguards under EU law apply? Is it
extradition if the suspect is merely ’on loan’ to the US and not
’extradited’ proper - as the US embassy cable suggests?
Could Julian Assange rely
on any safeguards if the United States requested his ’temporary
surrender’/conditional release from Sweden?
The retired Swedish judge Brita
Sundberg-Weitman (who testified at the first extradition hearing in
February) wrote to SwedenVersusAssange.com and explained that Sweden’s
Act regarding Criminal Extradition (Lag 1957:668 om Utlämning för Brott)
requires the Swedish government to apply to the Supreme Court for
permission to exercise the "conditional release" mechanism.
Sundberg-Weitman notes,
however, that the government could ignore that requirement with little
risk to itself; the legal and/or political repercussions, if any, would
most likely be negligible. They would in any event be too late to be of
any use to Julian Assange, who would have already been turned over to
the U.S.
Bearing in mind that the
the Swedish Courts (Stockholm District Court, Svea Court of Appeal)
granted the prosecutor’s application to have Julian Assange arrested
without seriously considering the principle of proportionality and that
the Supreme Court refused to reconsider that decision - it is rather
likely that the Supreme Court would approve a request by the government
to have Assange extradited to the US.
How likely is it that Sweden will extradite Julian Assange to the US?
Certainly
Assange’s lawyers would mount a very vigorous opposition [to
extradition] in either case [Sweden/UK], in London in particular. Past
U.S. extradition requests for criminals from the UK have faced vigorous
opposition, and a number of people have successfully resisted that
through appeals through the House of Lords and ultimately all the way up
to the European Court of Human Rights. We can anticipate lengthy
litigation. - John B. Bellinger III
Both the UK and Sweden refuse to guarantee that they will not
extradite Julian Assange to the United States. Political and military
extraditions are expressly prohibited under the extradition treaty
between Sweden and the United States, so this refusal is unusual.
Moreover, it is likely that the US will request extradition on charges
that are not overtly political (see below).
Shortly after issuing the
EAW and Interpol Red Notice to 188 countries, the prosecutor Marianne Ny
originally stated that extradition to the United States was ’out of the
question’ (05 December 2010) - but her statements were later redacted
(see Prosecution).
The Prime Minister Fredrik
Reinfeldt has adopted several strategies in order to lessen the pressure
on him to provide assurances that Julian Assange will not be extradited
to the United States:
1. Reinfeldt claims that the decision to extradite Julian Assange is up to the courts, not the executive.
This is false.
Sweden’s extradition treaty with the United States explicitly prohibits
political and military extraditions. The final decision lies in the
hands of the executive, who can block an extradition if it believes that
political/military motivations underlie the extradition order. However,
it it difficult to prove the underlying motivations of an extradition
order. The US is likely to issue an order under charges that are not
overtly political (see below).
It is likely that
the United States will decide to charge Julian Assange with a number of
offences (whether or not in conjunction with espionage) that are
seemingly not political offences. The US Department of Justice has
broadened its attack to include a possible indictment under the federal
computer crimes statute, which it would argue was a non-political
offence. Sweden is likely to consent to such an extradition given its
close relationship with the US and the argument that the offences he is
being sought for are not political in nature.
It is difficult
for an individual to prove that the underlying motivations for an
extradition are political, especially where the requesting state is a
close political ally, which is the case of the United States both for
Sweden and for the UK. Swedish troops are under NATO-US command in
Afghanistan. Sweden was one of the first countries to send fighter jets
to Libya at the request of the US and, in June, the Swedish parliament
voted to send marines to Libya together with more fighter jets (See
Political Interference).
2.
Reinfeldt claims that it is not up to Sweden, but up to the UK, whether
or not Julian Assange is extradited to the United States.
Sweden is shifting attention away from the fact that the final
decision of whether to extradite Julian Assange to the United States or
to block it is an executive decision.
Under EU law, Sweden should only initiate Julian Assange’s onward
extradition if and when the UK gives its agreement, but the UK has
little incentive to block an extradition order if Sweden does not take
the step to do so first. Moreover, legal commentators in the UK have
stated that it is likely that the UK would consent to Julian Assange’s
extradition from Sweden (this is likely to raise less criticism and
mobilisation if Julian Assange is not physically under UK custody).
Sweden has in the
recent past violated international treaties in relation to surrendering
foreign nationals into US custody to be interrogated and tortured (case
of extraordinary rendition, Agiza v. Sweden at the European Court of
Human Rights). Furthermore, Amnesty International and the UN Committee
against Torture criticised Sweden because it rendered two refugees to
the CIA who were then tortured under the Egyptian regime of Hosni
Mubarak. (A documentary with the testimony of tortured refugees who had
been granted asylum and then rendered to the CIA by Sweden was aired on
Swedish television on 5 October 2011.
Diplomatic
assurances that the person extradited will not be subjected to torture
or other inhumane and degrading treatment are not a sufficient guarantee
to prevent Julian Assange from suffering such treatment while in US
custody, or to realize a fair trial in the United States, given the
politicization of the allegations against him.
The UK and Swedish governments can choose to allege that Julian
Assange is not wanted for political offences, and will not interfere
with a judicial decision (despite the fact that this ’judicial decision’
would be taken by the secret grand jury in Virginia where there is no
judge or defence counsel).
Given that Julian Assange
is neither a citizen nor permanent resident in Sweden or the UK, these
countries have little incentive to afford him the type of protection
they would afford one of their own citizens or permanent residents.
Moreover, it is safe to assume that both the UK and Swedish government
have come under pressure to comply with the United States’ upcoming
request for Julian Assange’s extradition (these pressures by the US
government proved effective in the extra-judicial and arbitrary denial
of service by Mastercard, Visa, Paypal, Western Union & Bank of
America of WikiLeaks donations).
Wouldn’t the UK be more likely to extradite Juilan Assange?
If
the Justice Department were actually to issue charges against Mr.
Assange while he was still in Britain there could be potentially a
decision for the UK government whether to extradite him to Sweden or to
the United States, and that could get to be a complicated clash between
the two different requests which would put the UK government in a
difficult position. - John B. Bellinger III on Fox News
Some critical voices claim
that the UK-US extradition treaty is more permissive than the Sweden-US
extradition treaty. Extradition to the US, they claim, would be simpler
from the UK than from Sweden.
This argument fails on several points:
- The UK’s
extradition treaty does not have the temporary surrender (’conditional
release’) clause. The UK’s judicial review process, while far from
perfect, has a number of practical review mechanisms. The nearest
equivalent case, of Gary McKinnon - a UK citizen who has been charged
for hacking US military systems - has been opposed in the courts for 8
years.
- Public opinion
and the media (to a greater extent) are more sympathetic to Julian
Assange in the UK than in Sweden. Public pressure could draw out the
process of extradition to the United States in the UK. In Sweden the
media climate is hostile (see Media climate in Sweden) due to the sex
allegations. Public outcry would be significantly weaker and therefore
less likely to stand in the way of a strategically convenient
extradition.
- In the UK,
Julian Assange is better able to defend himself, muster support and
understand the legal procedures against him. In Sweden on the other
hand, the language barrier prevents him from effectively challenging the
actions against.
- The UK is
politically better positioned to withstand pressure from the United
States than Sweden. Sweden is a small country of nine million people
close to Russia. It has grown increasingly dependent on the United
States. In recent years Sweden has complied with directives from the
United States in a manner that has not been scrutinised by Parliament,
as has been revealed by the disclosed diplomatic cables (see Political
Interference).
United States: Secret Grand Jury
The United States is looking to charge Julian Assange under the Espionage Act among other charges:
- A secret grand
jury located in Alexandria, Virginia, only six kilometres from central
Washington D.C., has been meeting since December 2010. The grand jury
decides whether to bring charges against Julian Assange and other people
associated with WikiLeaks.
- The grand jury
is held in secret, with no judge and no defence counsel. Four
prosecutors are imposing subpoenas on individuals who are affiliated
with WikiLeaks and on social networking sites including Twitter to
disclose information about WikiLeaks’ work.
- A respected
former chief judge of New York’s highest court, Sol Wachtler, famously
coined the expression a grand jury would “indict a ham sandwich”, given
that prosecutors have complete control over the process.
- The grand jury
consists of 16-23 people. Given the high incidence of government
employees and public and military contractors living in this
geographical area, it is likely that a majority of the components of the
grand jury are ideologically opposed to WikiLeaks’ work.
- The grand jury
will most likely decide to prosecute, even on weak grounds that would
not withstand the minimum threshold under normal criminal processes.
- It is
plausible that the grand jury has already decided to prosecute, and that
a sealed indictment has been issued for extradition and will be
unsealed when US extradition is convenient.
United States: What would happen if Julian Assange was extradited?
The suspected whistleblower Bradley
Manning has been subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment. Julian
Assange is likely to face similar treatment or worse: he will not be
afforded the same constitutional rights as Bradley Manning because he is
a foreign national. Over the past ten years the United States has
developed a doctrine that denies basic rights to foreign political
prisoners.
The 2012 US presidential
elections are an opportunity to seize upon for the campaign trail:
Julian Assange’s prosecution will probably be used by presidential
candidates to show they are strong on "national security". Senators and
presidential candidates have already called on the Obama administration
to take an aggressive approach.
Republican candidates have urged
the US treasury and Department of State to label WikiLeaks as a
terrorist organisation, and to ’illegally assassinate’ or kidnap him,
and treat him and his associates as ’enemy combatants’.
In other words, internal
political pressure is calling for the United States to illegally apply
torture in order to extract information, subject him to inhumane and
degrading treatment as they have with Bradley Manning, or sentence
Julian Assange to the death penalty. Public pronouncements by US
senators and television personalities amount to hate speech and
persecution (see Timing of EAW and INTERPOL Red Notice ).
Related Articles
The European Arrest Warrant
Timing of EAW and INTERPOL Red Notice
Political Interference
Fair Trial for Julian Assange?
Rule of Law
Additional Resources
Rendering Assange: Hillary Clinton’s revenge? Gena Mason, WL Central, 12 November 2011.
John Pilger "The Smearing of a revolution" in the New Statesman, 6 October 2011.
Council on Foreign Relations, ’The Legal Case against WikiLeaks’ - Interview with John Bellinger III (December 13 2010)
Christian Science Monitor: WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange: Has US already indicted him?
Douglas McNabb, US Federal Criminal Lawyer ’Julian Assage - Sweden and US Extradition Treaty’
E.B. Boyd: Why Twitter Was the Only Company to Challenge the Secret WikiLeaks Subpoena
Svenska Dagbladet The decision to extradite is not up to Sweden
Source URL
|