Introduction
The US-EU sponsored coup in the Ukraine
and its conversion from a stable Russian trading partner, to a devastated EU
economic client and NATO launch pad, as well as the subsequent economic
sanctions against Russia for supporting the Russian ethnic majority in the
Donbas region and Crimea, illustrate the dangerous vulnerability of the Russian
economy and state. The current effort to increase Russia’s national security
and economic viability in the face of these challenges requires a critical
analysis of the policies and structures emerging in the post-Soviet era.
Pillage as Privatization
Over the past quarter century, several
trillion dollars worth of public property in every sector of the Russian
economy was illegally transferred or violently seized by gangster-oligarchs
acting through armed gangs, especially during its ‘transition to capitalism’.
From 1990 to 1999, over 6 million
Russian citizens died prematurely as a result of the catastrophic collapse of
the economy; life expectancy for males declined from 67 years during the Soviet
era to 55 year during the Yeltsin period. Russia’s GNP declined sixty percent –
a historic first for a country not at war. Following Yeltsin’s violent
seizure of power and his bombing of the Russian parliament, the regime
proceeded to ‘prioritize’ the privatization of the economy, selling off the
energy, natural resources, banking, transport and communication sectors at
one-tenth or less of their real value to well-connected cronies and foreign
entities. Armed thugs, organized by emerging oligarchs “completed”
the program of privatization by assaulting, murdering and threatening rivals. Hundreds
of thousands of elderly pensioners were tossed out of their homes and
apartments in a vicious land-grab by violent property speculators. US and
European academic financial consultants “advised” rival oligarchs and
government ministers on the most “efficient” market techniques for pillaging
the economy, while skimming off lucrative fees and commissions –fortunes were
made for the well-connected. Meanwhile, living standards collapsed,
impoverishing two thirds of Russian households, suicides quadrupled and deaths
from alcoholism, drug addiction, HIV and venereal diseases became
rampant. Syphilis and tuberculosis reached epidemic proportions – diseases
fully controlled during the Soviet era remerged with the closure of clinics and
hospitals.
Of course, the respectable western
media celebrated the pillage of Russia as the transition to “free
elections and a free market economy”. They wrote glowing articles
describing the political power and dominance of gangster oligarchs as the
reflection of a rising “liberal democracy”. The Russian state was thus
converted from a global superpower into an abject client regime penetrated by
western intelligence agencies and unable to govern and enforce its treaties and
agreements with Western powers. The US and EU rapidly displaced Russian
influence in Eastern Europe and quickly snapped up former state-owned
industries, the mass media and financial institutions. Communist and leftist
and even nationalist officials were ousted and replaced by pliant and
subservient ‘free market’ pro-NATO politicians. The US and EU violated every
single agreement signed by Gorbachev and the West: Eastern European
regimes became NATO members; West Germany annexed the East and military bases
were expanded right up to Russia’s borders. Pro-NATO “think tanks” were
established and supplied intelligence and anti-Russian propaganda. Hundreds of
NGOs, funded by the US, operated within Russia as propaganda and organizing
instruments for “subservient” neo-liberal politicians. In the former Soviet
Caucuses and Far East, the West fomented separatist sectarian movements and
armed uprisings, especially in Chechnya; the US sponsored dictators in the
Caucuses and corrupt neo-liberal puppets in Georgia. The Russian state was
colonized and its putative ruler, Boris Yeltsin, often in a drunken stupor, was
propped up and manipulated to scratch out executive fiats . . . further
disintegrating the state and society.
The Yeltsin decade is observed and
remembered by the Russian people as a disaster and by the US-EU, the Russian
oligarchs and their followers as a ‘Golden Age’… of pillage. For the immense
majority of Russians it was the Dark Ages when Russian science and culture were
ravaged; world-class scientists, artists and engineers were starved of incomes
and driven to despair, flight and poverty. For the US, the EU and the oligarchs
it was the era of ‘easy pickings’: economic, cultural and intellectual pillage,
billion dollar fortunes, political impunity, unbridled criminality and
subservience to Western dictates. Agreements with the Russian state were violated
even before the ink was dry. It was the era of the unipolar US-centered world,
the ‘New World Order’ where Washington could influence and invade nationalist
adversaries and Russian allies with impunity.
The Golden Era of unchallenged world
domination became the Western ‘standard’ for judging Russia after Yeltsin. Every
domestic and foreign policy, adopted during the Putin years 2000 – 2014, has
been judged by Washington according to whether it conformed or deviated from
the Yeltsin decade of unchallenged pillage and manipulation.
The Putin Era: State and
Economic Reconstruction and EU-US Belligerence
President Putin’s first and foremost
task was to end Russia’s collapse into nothingness. Over time, the state and
economy recovered some semblance of order and legality. The economy began to
recover and grow; employment, wages and living standards, and mortality rates
improved. Trade, investment and financial transactions with the West were
normalized – unadulterated pillage was prosecuted. Russia’s recovery was viewed
by the West with ambiguity: Many legitimate business people and MNCs welcomed
the re-establishment of law and order and the end of gangsterism; in contrast, policymakers
in Washington and Brussels as well as the vulture capitalists of Wall Street
and the City of London quickly condemned what they termed Putin’s ‘rising
authoritarianism’ and ‘statism’, as Russian authorities began to
investigate the oligarchs for tax evasion, large-scale money laundering, the
corruption of public officials and even murder.
Putin’s rise to power coincided with
the worldwide commodity boom. The spectacular rise in the price of Russian oil
and gas and metals (2003-2013) allowed the Russian economy to grow at a rapid
rate while the Russian state increased its regulation of the economy and began
to restore its military. Putin’s success in ending the most egregious forms of
pillage of the Russian economy and re-establishing Russian sovereignty made him
popular with the electorate: he was repeatedly re-elected by a robust majority.
As Russia distanced itself from the quasi-satellite policies, personnel and practices
of the Yeltsin years, the US and EU launched a multi-prong hostile political
strategy designed to undermine President Putin and restore pliant Yeltsin-like
neo-liberal clones to power. Russian NGOs funded by US foundations and acting
as CIA fronts, organized mass protests targeting the elected officials. Western-backed ultra-liberal political
parties competed unsuccessfully for national and local offices. The US-funded
Carnegie Center, a notorious propaganda mill, churned out virulent tracts purporting
to describe Putin’s demonic ‘authoritarian’ policies, his ‘persecution’
of dissident oligarchs and his ‘return’ to a ‘Soviet style command
economy’.
While the West sought to restore the ‘Golden
Age of Pillage’ via internal political surrogates, it pursued an aggressive
foreign policy designed to eliminate Russian allies and trading partners,
especially in the Middle East. The US invaded Iraq, murdered Saddam Hussein and
the Baath Party leadership, and established a sectarian puppet regime,
eliminating Moscow’s key secular-nationalist ally in the region. The US decreed
sanctions on Iran, a major lucrative trading partner with Russia. The US and
the EU backed a large-scale armed insurgency to overthrow President Bashaar
Assad in Syria, another Russian ally, and to deprive the Russian Navy of a
friendly port on the Mediterranean. The US and the EU bombed Libya, a major oil
and trade partner of Russia (and China) hoping to install a pro-Western client
regime.
Goading Russia in the Caucasus and on
the Black Sea, the US backed-Georgian regime invaded a Russian protectorate,
South Ossetia, in 2008, killing scores of Russian peacekeepers and hundreds of
civilians, but was repelled by a furious Russian counter-attack.
In 2014, the Western offensive to
isolate, encircle and eventually undermine any possibility of an independent
Russian state went into high gear. The US financed a civil-military coup
ousting the elected regime of President Viktor Yanukovytch, who had opposed EU
annexation and NATO affiliation. Washington imposed a puppet regime deeply
hostile to Russia and ethnic Russian-Ukrainian citizens in the southeast and
Crimea. Russian opposition to the coup and support for pro-democracy
federalists in the south-east and Crimea served as a pretext for Western
sanctions in an effort to undermine Russia’s oil, banking and manufacturing
sectors and to cripple its economy.
Imperial strategists in Washington and
Brussels broke all previous agreements with the Putin Administration and tried
to turn Putin’s oligarch allies against the Russian president by threatening
their holdings in the West (especially laundered bank accounts and properties). Russian state oil companies, engaged in
joint ventures with Chevron, Exxon, and Total, were suddenly cut off from
Western capital markets.
The cumulative impact of this
decade-long Western offensive culminating in the current wave of severe
sanctions was to provoke a recession in Russia, to undermine the currency (the
ruble declined 23% in 2014), drive up the cost of imports and hurt local
consumers. Russian industries,
dependent on foreign equipment and parts, as well as oil companies dependent on
imported technology for exploiting the Arctic reserves were made to feel the
pain of ‘Putin’s intransigence’.
Despite the short-term successes of the
US-EU war against the Russian economy, the Putin Administration has remained
extremely popular among the Russian electorate, with approval ratings exceeding
80%. This has relegated Putin’s pro-Western opposition to the dustbin of
history. Nevertheless the Western sanctions policy and the aggressive political
– NATO military encirclement of Russia, has exposed the vulnerabilities of
Moscow.
Russian Vulnerabilities: The
Limits of Putin’s Restoration of Russian Sovereignty
In the aftermath of the Western and
Russian oligarch’s pillage of the Russian economy and the savage degradation of
Russian society, President Putin pursued a complex strategy.
First, he sought to differentiate
between ‘political’ and ‘economic’ oligarchs: the latter included
oligarchs willing to co-operate with the government in rebuilding the economy
and willing to confine their activity to the generous guidelines set forth by
President Putin. They retained enormous economic power and profits, but not
political power. In exchange, Putin allowed the ‘economic’ oligarchs to
maintain their dubiously acquired business empires. In contrast, those
oligarchs who sought political power and financed Yeltsin-era
politicians were targeted – some were stripped of their fortunes and others
were prosecuted for crimes, ranging from money laundering, tax evasion,
swindles and illegal transfer of funds overseas up to financing the murder of
their rivals.
The second focus of President Putin’s
early political strategy was to deepen Russian cooperation with Western states
and economies but on the basis of reciprocal market exchanges rather than
one-sided, Western appropriation of Russian resources prevalent under Yeltsin. Putin
sought to secure greater political-military integration with the US and EU to
ensure Russian borders and spheres of influence. To that end, President Putin
opened Russian military bases and supply lines for the US-EU military forces
engaged in the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and he did not oppose the
EU-US sanctions against Iran. Putin acquiesced to the US invasion and
occupation of Iraq, despite Russia’s longstanding economic ties with Baghdad. He
joined the five powers ‘overseeing” the Palestine – Israeli ‘peace’ talks and
went along with Washington’s one-sided support of Israel. He even gave the ‘green
light’ to the NATO bombing of Libya, naively assuming it would be a limited
affair – a ‘humanitarian’ intervention.
As a result of Putin’s political and
diplomatic collusion with the Washington-NATO military expansion, Russian
trade, investment and finance with the West prospered. Russian firms raised
loans in Western capital markets; foreign investors flocked to the Russian
stock market and multi-nationals formed joint ventures. Major oil and gas
ventures flourished. The Russian
economy recovered the living standards of the Soviet era; consumer spending
boomed; unemployment fell from double to single digit; salaries and back wages
were paid and research centers, universities, schools and cultural institutions
began to recover.
The third component of Putin’s strategy
was the state recovery (re-nationalization) of the strategic oil and gas
sector. By outright purchase and buy-outs, through financial audits and the
confiscation of the assets of gangster oligarchs, the Russian state takeover of
oil and gas was successful. These re-nationalized sectors formed joint ventures
with Western oil giants and led Russian exports during a period of peak energy
demand. With the rise in oil prices over the Putin decade, Russia experienced a
consumer-driven import boom – from agricultural commodities to luxury jewelry
and autos… Putin consolidated his electoral support and deepened Russia’s
‘integration’ in Western markets.
Putin’s expansion and growth strategy
looked exclusively westward to the EU and US, and not east to Asia/China or
south to Latin America.
With this focus on the West, Putin’s
initial tactical success began to expose Russia’s strategic vulnerabilities. The
first signs were evident in the Western support for the corrupt oligarchs’ anti-Putin campaign and the
media’s demonization of the Russian judicial system which prosecuted and
convicted gangster oligarchs, like Mikhail Khodorkovsky. The second sign was
the West’s financial and political support of the Yeltsin-era neo-liberals
competing against Putin’s United Russia Party and candidates…It became clear
that Putin’s effort to restore Russian sovereignty conflicted with the West’s
plans to maintain Russia as a vassal state. The West favorably counterpoised
the Golden Years of unrestrained pillage and domination of the Yeltsin period
to the Putin era of an independent and dynamic Russia – by constantly tying the
Russian president to the defunct Soviet Union and the KGB.
In 2010, the US encouraged its client,
President Sakashvili of Georgia to invade Russia’s protectorate in South
Ossetia. This was the first major indication that Putin’s accommodation with
the West was counter-productive. Russian territorial borders, its allies and
spheres of influence became Western targets. The US and EU condemned Russia’s
defensive response even as Moscow withdrew its troops from Georgia after
applying a sound beating.
Georgia was a militarist dress
rehearsal; one of several western planned and financed coups - some dubbed
‘color revolutions’ other’s NATO ‘humanitarian interventions’. Yugoslavia in
the Balkans was fragmented by NATO bombing and Ukraine had several ‘color’
uprisings up to the present bloody ‘civil war’. Washington and Brussels
interpreted Putin’s series of conciliatory measures as weakness and felt free
to encroach further on Russia’s frontier and to knock off regimes friendly to
Russia.
By the middle of the second decade of
the new century, the US and EU made a major strategic decision to weaken
Russia’s security and its economy sovereignty: to seize control over Ukraine,
expel Russia from its Black Sea military base in Crimea, convert the Ukraine
into an advanced NATO outpost and cut Eastern Ukraine’s economic ties with
Russia – especially the Russian market for the strategic Ukrainian military
weaponry. The coup was financed by the West, while far-right and neo-Nazi Ukraine
gangs provided the shock troops .The Kiev junta organized a war of conquest directed
at purging the anti-coup, pro-democracy forces in the southeast Donbas region
with its Russian ethnic majority and heavy industrial ties to Russia.
When Putin finally recognized the clear
danger to Russia’s national security, his government responded by annexing
Crimea after a popular referendum and started to provide sanctuary and supply
lines for the embattled anti-Kiev federalists in eastern Ukraine. The West
exploited the vulnerabilities in the Russian economy, which had resulted from
Putin’s development model, and imposed wide-reaching economic sanctions
designed to cripple Russia’s economy.
Western Sanctions, Russian Weakness:
Rethinking Putin’s Strategic Approach
Western aggressive militarism and the
sanctions against Russia exposed several critical vulnerabilities of Putin’s
economic and political strategy. These include (1) his dependence on
Western-oriented ‘economic oligarchs’ to promote his strategy for Russian
economic growth; (2) his acceptance of most of the privatizations of the
Yeltsin era; (3) his decision to focus on trade with the West, ignoring the
China market, (4) his embrace of a gas and oil export strategy instead of
developing a diversified economy; (5) his dependence on his allied robber-baron
oligarchs – with no real experience in developing industry, no true financial
skills, scant technological expertise and no concept of marketing – to restore
and run the peak manufacturing sector. In contrast to the Chinese, the Russian
oligarchs have been totally dependent on Western markets, finance and
technology and have done little to develop domestic markets, implement
self-financing by re-investing their profits or upgrade productivity via
Russian technology and research.
In the face of Western sanctions
Putin’s leading oligarch-allies are his weakest link in formulating an
effective response. They press Putin to give in to Washington as they plead
with Western banks to have their properties and accounts exempt from the
sanctions. They are desperate to protect their assets in London and New York. In
a word, they are desperate for President Putin to abandon the freedom fighters
in southeast Ukraine and cut a deal with the Kiev junta.
This highlights the contradiction
within Putin’s strategy of working with the ‘economic’ oligarchs, who
have agreed not to oppose Putin within Russia, while transferring their massive
wealth to Western banks, investing in luxury real estate in London, Paris and
Manhattan and forming loyalties outside of Russia. In effect, they are closely
tied to Russia’s current political enemies. Putin’s tactical success
in harnessing oligarchs to his project of growth via stability has turned into
a strategic weakness in defending the country from crippling economic
reprisals.
Putin’s acceptance of the Yeltsin-era
privatizations provided a certain stability in the short-run but it led to
the massive flight of private capital overseas rather than remaining to be
invested in projects to insure greater self-sufficiency. Today the capacity of
the Russian government to mobilize and convert its economy into an engine of
growth and to withstand imperial pressure is much weaker than the economy would
have been if it was under greater state control. Putin will have a difficult
time convincing private owners of major Russian industries to make sacrifices –
they are too accustomed to receiving favors, subsidies and government
contracts. Moreover, as their financial counterparts in the West press for
payments on debts and deny new credits, the private elites are threatening to
declare bankruptcy or to cut back production and discharge workers.
The rising tide of Western military
encroachments on Russia’s borders, the string of broken promises regarding the
incorporation of Eastern Europe into NATO and the bombing and destruction of
Yugoslavia in the 1990’s, should have shown Putin that no amount of unilateral
concessions was likely to win Western acceptance as a bona fide “partner”. Washington and Brussels were unwavering
in their strategy to encircle and maintain Russia as a client.
Instead of turning west and offering
support for US-NATO wars, Russia would have been in a far better position to
resist sanctions and current military threats if it had diversified and
oriented its economy and markets toward Asia, in particular China, with its
dynamic economic growth and expanding domestic market, investment capacity and
growing technical expertise. Clearly, China’s foreign policy has not been
accompanied by wars and invasion of Russian allies and encroachment on Russia’s
borders. While Russia has now turned to increase economic ties with Asia in the
face of growing NATO threats, a great deal of time and space has been lost over
the past 15 years. It will take another decade to reorient the Russian economy,
with its major industries still controlled by the mediocre oligarchs and
kleptocrats, holdovers from the Yeltsin period.
With the closure of Western markets,
Putin has had to ‘pivot’ to China, other Asian nations and Latin America to
find new markets and economic partners. But his growth strategy still depends
on oil and gas exports and most of Russia’s private ‘business leaders’ are not
real entrepreneurs capable of developing new competitive products, substituting
Russian technology and inputs and identifying profitable markets. This
generation of Russian ‘business leaders’ did not build their economic empires
or conglomerates from the ‘bottom up’ – they seized and pillaged their assets
from the public sector and they grew their wealth through state contracts and
protection. Moscow now asks them to find alternative overseas markets, to
innovate, compete and replace their dependence on German machinery.
The bulk of what passes for the Russian
industrial capitalist class are not entrepreneurs, they are more like
rent collectors and cronies – oriented to the West. Their origins are more
often as gangsters and warlords who early on strong- armed their rivals out of
the public giveaways of the 1990’s. While these oligarchs have sought to gain
respectability after consolidating their economic empires and hired public
relations agencies to polish their images and economic consultants to advise
them on investments, they have never demonstrated any capacity to grow their
firms into competitive enterprises. Instead they remained wholly dependent on
capital, technology and intermediary imports from the West and subsidies from
the Putin Administration.
The so-called Russian “capitalist”
rentiers stand in sharp contrast to the dynamic Chinese public and private
entrepreneurs – who borrowed overseas technology from the US, Japan, Taiwan and
Germany, adapted and improved on the technology and are producing advanced
highly competitive products. When the US-EU sanctions came into force, Russian
industry found itself unprepared to substitute local production and President
Putin had to arrange trade and import agreements with China and other sources
for inputs.
The biggest strategic flaw in
Putin’s economic strategy was his decision to concentrate on gas and oil
exports to the West as his ‘engine of growth’. This resulted in Russia’s
dependency on high prices for commodity exports and Western markets. With this
in mind the US and EU exploited Russia’s vulnerability to any drop in the world
price for energy and its dependence on Western oil extraction technology,
equipment and joint ventures.
Putin’s policy has relied on a vision
of economic integration with the West alongside greater co-operation and
political connections with the NATO powers. These assumptions have been proven
wrong by the march of events: US and EU cooperation was tactical and
contingent on asymmetrical, indeed unilateral, concessions from Russia –
especially its continued willingness to sacrifice its traditional allies in the
Balkans, Middle East, North Africa and especially the Caucuses. Once Russia
began to assert its own interests, the West turned hostile and confrontational.
Ever since Russia opposed the coup regime in Kiev, the West’s goal has been the
overthrow of Putin’s Russia. The ongoing Western offensive against Russia is
not a passing phase: it is the beginning of a prolonged, intensified economic
and political confrontation.
Though Russia is vulnerable, it is not
without resources and capacity to resist, defend its national security and
advance its economy.
Conclusion: What is to be Done?
First and foremost Russia must diversify
its economy; it must industrialize its raw materials and invest heavily in
substituting local production for Western imports. While shifting its trade to
China is a positive step, it must not replicate the previous commodities (oil
and gas) for manufactured goods trading pattern of the past.
Secondly, Russia must re-nationalize
its banking, foreign trade and strategic industries, ending the dubious
political and economic loyalties and rentier behavior of the current
dysfunctional private ‘capitalist’ class. The Putin Administration must shift
from oligarchs to technocrats, from rentiers to entrepreneurs, from speculators
who earn in Russia and invest in the West to workers co-participation– in a
word it must deepen the national, public, and productive character of the
economy. It is not enough to claim that oligarchs who remain in Russia and
declare loyalty to the Putin Administration are legitimate economic agents.
They have generally disinvested from Russia, transferred their wealth abroad
and have questioned legitimate state authority under pressure from Western
sanctions.
Russia needs a new economic and
political revolution - in which the government recognizes the West as an
imperial threat and in which it counts on the organized Russian working class
and not on dubious oligarchs. The Putin Administration has pulled Russia from
the abyss and has instilled dignity and self-respect among Russians at home and
abroad by standing up to Western aggression in the Ukraine. From this point on,
President Putin needs to move forward and dismantle the entire Yeltsin
klepto-state and economy and re-industrialize, diversify and develop its own
high technology for a diversified economy. And above all Russia needs to create new democratic, popular forms of
democracy to sustain the transition to a secure, anti-imperialist and sovereign
state. President Putin has the backing of the vast majority of Russian people;
he has the scientific and professional cadre; he has allies in China and among
the BRICs; and he has the will and the power to “do the right thing”. The
question remains whether Putin will succeed in this historical mission or
whether, out of fear and indecision, he will capitulate before the threats of a
dangerous and decaying West.
© Copyright 2014 by AxisofLogic.com
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